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**Rational decisions and responses of dictatorships  
in authoritarian states with veto power**

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**Abstract.** Using the model, this study makes eight policy recommendations for creating a new postwar deterrent world order when the warring parties are authoritarian dictatorships with veto power and nuclear powers. First, as long as the ceasefire condition is the abandonment of an independent state by a dictatorship and the retention of an independent state by an invaded state, ceasefire negotiations tend to be parallel unless a mediator is obtained; Second, since democratic states require public consent before the decision to start the war, the obstacles to the start of the war are this is greater than in dictatorships. Third, the distance between a dictatorship and a country determines the decisions of its leaders. The greater the distance, the more likely it is to provide only economic assistance. The closer a country is to the point where it feels threatened if the occupation is tolerated, the more military assistance it will provide. Fourth, when a dictatorship initiates a war of aggression, neighboring countries tend to use economic sanctions to weaken the dictatorship's ability to wage war to avoid a major-power war. Fifth, it is essential to introduce a system in which the veto power of a permanent member of the UN Security Council is suspended if it violates the UN Charter or is a war party. The sixth is the establishment of a permanent UN force that can intervene in areas of conflict by a certain level of resolution of the UN General Assembly. Register with the UN volunteer soldiers who can act in the exercise of war, so that they can be deployed early in the event of a war of aggression by a major power against a minor power. Eighth, make wartime statements by dictators and leaders of invaded countries in the media and elsewhere binding under international law.

**Keywords.** Veto power; Dictator; Authoritarian states.

JEL. F51; F52; P16; P26; P48.

## 1. Introduction

The optimal behavior of states bordering nearly on the enemy camp differs between democracies and authoritarian states with dictatorships. This study explains the response to Taiwan for China, an authoritarian state, and to Ukraine for Russia.

The psychology of dictatorships is that they maintain their dictatorships by suppressing criticism of their regimes in the media and elsewhere with military and police power, so a relative decline in military power is negative for the long-term maintenance of the dictatorship. It is also important for a dictatorship to determine whether its military power is

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large enough not only to maintain domestic power but also relative to foreign military power. A decline in a dictatorship's military power relative to foreign military power can destabilize its influence. This is because the possibility of the emergence of domestic forces to overthrow dictatorship increases when the dictatorship works with other countries that have stronger military power. The threat of aggression in one's own country is strong for both the dictatorship with strong military power and the countries bordering the dictatorship. The threat of war and the probability of victory in the event of war depend first on the distance from the enemy country, specifically the distance between the country's capital and its borders, second on the size of the enemy country's military power against the country, and third on the country's possession of nuclear weapons. Even if a dictatorship uses nuclear weapons against an invading country, nuclear deterrence will not function without the possibility of retaliation in the form of nuclear weapons being used against its capital or itself.

The presence of an ally to a dictatorship not only reduces damage to the dictatorship through economic support when economic sanctions arise for the dictatorship but also has the advantage of facilitating ceasefire talks if the ally becomes a mediator in the ceasefire talks. If a dictatorship can expect that military intervention by another country will not occur in the event of an invasion by a dictatorship, the threat of war is greatly reduced for the dictatorship by decreasing the probability of defeat in the war. Military intervention by other countries is affected by the probability of membership in a military alliance of the enemy camp or the intervention of a multinational force. If an authoritarian state with a dictator is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it can be predicted that no UN forces will be deployed because of the veto power. However, if the war is protracted, the dictatorial state could be subject to any sanction other than the invocation of the veto. Through a war of aggression, it is likely to be subject to economic sanctions, the damage of which will increase as the war is prolonged. The damage of economic sanctions would be reduced to some extent by securing economic support from prior allies. If the damage from economic sanctions becomes so great that the country is unable to secure the funds to carry out the war, or if criticism from domestic political parties and the military, which are the domestic support base, increases through economic sanctions, the country will have no choice but to agree to ceasefire talks, even if the content is unsatisfactory. Authoritarian states can manipulate their approval ratings, so domestic demonstrations are not too costly for dictatorships. However, if they become so large that the military or the party's base of support is diminished, the likelihood of regime change increases. In authoritarian states, the priority for gaining support is the military, followed by the party. In democracies, the priority is first the people, then the party, although there are some differences from country to country. In a dictatorship, if the military cannot adequately repay the sacrifices made in the war, or if the goal of occupying the invading country cannot be achieved, regime change is likely.

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The military will expect the dictatorship to be supported by domestic public opinion in the long run through its role as the voice of the military, by securing the military's budget and other influences on domestic politics, and through war results that are commensurate with the costs of the war, such as casualties. If the military were to agree to cease-fire talks to the contrary, subsequent support for the dictatorship would be lost from the military. For the dictator, this means that the defeat of the war would create for the dictator the possibility of being punished as a war criminal by a replacement dictator or, depending on the circumstances, by the incoming regime. This means that if a dictator launches a war, the only way to win the war is to kill or maim civilians. The dictator cannot give up on victory because of the possibility of being killed himself. For the dictator, his political base of support, the supporting political parties, will demand from him the stable assurance of benefits and authority, including money, that comes with maintaining a one-party dictatorship. However, the rising number of casualties, war without cause, and the damage to the domestic economy caused by economic sanctions will turn domestic public opinion against the war, and they will be willing to accept ceasefire talks and, if necessary, replace the dictator before the anti-war movement reaches a level that makes a one-party dictatorship unsustainable. Balancing the support of both the military and the political parties becomes more difficult as the war drags on.

In addition, if a dictatorship is terrorized, it can lead to wars of aggression and the use of nuclear weapons by the dictatorship and can be a factor in the arms buildup and the arms race of neighboring countries as a deterrent to contain the dictatorship.

Dictatorships demand neutralization and demilitarization of the invading country. The purpose of neutralization is not only to create a military vacuum with the enemy camp but also to ensure that if the possibility of war with the enemy camp increases through demilitarization, the country can invade militarily at its convenience. If there is a dictator who wants to create a puppet regime or ruling power through the war in a neighboring country, demilitarization and neutralization will result in a state that is not independent and threatens the protection of human rights, freedoms, and property of its citizens. In such a situation, the security of the dictatorship through the demands of the dictator leads to the greatest anxiety for the neighboring democracies. For dictatorships, starting a war is easy because domestic public opinion can be ignored. The start of war does not require direct public consent or the support of a parliament that reflects the will of the citizens and can proceed behind closed doors, depending on the circumstances. If a dictator expects that the other side will avoid a major-power war, all but the major powers and nuclear powers can become targets of his war.

Consider the countries that mediate ceasefire talks. Before World War I, many ceasefire talks were conducted by a mediating country other than the United States. However, while there is no benefit to the mediating country,

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the mediating country itself will offer itself as a mediator if it is recognized by both countries as militarily strong or otherwise wishes to avoid incurring significant losses by agreeing to a ceasefire on terms that are fatally disadvantageous to one of the countries as the war drags on.

Consider an ally, a country that has provided economic support to a dictatorship that is the target of economic sanctions. We should also impose economic sanctions on allies. The reason is that countries that wage wars of aggression are most likely to be economic powers. If a dictatorial state or an ally is an economic power, sanctions such as legal sanctions and economic sanctions will have limited effect, and if a Security Council member with veto power is a dictatorial state, the effect of economic and military sanctions may be nullified because UN troops will not be deployed.

This study deals with a model. However, rather than selecting the optimal behavior by deriving an equilibrium from the model, the optimal behavior of each player is considered through the presentation of the model. The reason is that the presentation of the model simplifies the behavior of each player. The conclusion that can be obtained by deriving an equilibrium is the cease-fire condition, but this is because the equilibrium point cannot be a politically effective compromise point as long as one of the warring parties aims to maintain an independent state and the other aims to collapse the independent state. This study examines clues to resolving wars, which tend to be complex, by presenting a simplified representation of the war situation through a model. In addition, the purpose of this study is to provide policy recommendations for creating a new postwar world order with deterrence when the warring parties are authoritarian dictatorships with veto power and nuclear powers.

## 2. Advance research

### 2.1. Prior research on new institutional transitions through civil wars and wars

Several studies have examined the impact of fiscal capacity and the level of military technology on political equilibrium; Gennaoli & Voth (2013) examined the process by which powerful nation-states emerge from many small states through military competition. They examined it under two types of actors: those with strong fiscal capacity and those with weak fiscal capacity. Besley & Persson (2011) modeled the competition of challengers to rulers and analyzed the conditions that lead to the defeat or survival of rulers.

Aoki (2017), using a multi-period game model, found that satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker Condition and ensuring that there is always one equilibrium because it is Super Modular, and compensating for the ruler's reduced losses due to institutional transitions through civil war is the ruler's. The study found that resistance could be reduced. He showed that the probability of a successful transition to a new system increases as the fixed costs of transitioning to a new system decrease and as challengers to the

regime and opportunists shift their positions from competitive to complementary. The results of the analysis are applied to Japan and China. As a way to compensate for the reduced losses of the rulers in the transition to the new system, the shogunate returned power to the emperor in the final days of the Japanese shogunate through the "Taiseihokan" (return of power to the shogunate), thereby avoiding the costs of war and the future destruction of the shogunate, and the shoguns lived as an aristocratic class (nobility) after the civil war. In exchange for a certain guarantee of the ruling class's life and property, the guarantee of a reduction in the ruler's losses reduced the cost of transition. Such cases of regime transitions and the end of civil wars have been seen in the past in many countries to speed up the end of wars. An example of lowering the fixed costs of transition to a new system is the alliance between Satsuma and Choshu at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate: rather than having one clan provide all supplies, arms, ammunition, etc., if multiple players could share the costs of arms, ammunition, supplies, etc., they could form an alliance and engage in civil war. A similar case can be seen in the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party against Japan during World War II and the Sino-Japanese War.

### 2.2. Previous research on the choices and differences in political institutions

Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2006), Rosendorff (2001), Boix (2003), Zak & Feng (2003) focused on the choice of regime type of elites in government. They showed that the type of regime chosen differed by adding the threat of economic class struggle and insurgency by citizens. The characteristics of authoritarian dictatorships, such as Russia, which elect a president through elections but have elections that are not internationally recognized as fair, are that elections make the regime more acceptable to its citizens. There are numerous studies on the informational effects of elections in authoritarian dictatorships (Magaloni, 2006; Cox, 2009; Malesky & Schuler, 2011; Miller, 2011).

Studies dealing with the strategic incentives of democratization players include Weingast (1997), Sutter (2000), Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2006), Rosendorff (2001), Boix (2003, 2008), Zak & Feng (2003), Lizzeri & Persico (2004), Llavador & Oxoby (2005), Przeworski (2005), Ansell & Samuels (2010). The first motivation for the choice of democratization is the product of strategic choices by elites (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001, 2006; Rosendorff 2001; Boix 2003; Lizzeri & Persico 2004; Llavador & Oxoby 2005). Cases in which democracy is founded purely by forces from below are very rare (Karl 1990); O'Donnell *et al.* (1986) emphasize divisions within the ruling class elite and argue that democratization occurs when the dominant faction strategically supports democracy. The "Municipalities of the World," which is the name of the government, is a good example. Second, the main motivation for a dictator to choose democracy is the threat of a candidate or

group with the support of the citizens, leading to an insurgency (Weingast, 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001, 2006; Boix, 2003; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Smith, 2008) to prevent large-scale revolts, policy concessions are achieved by the dictator to introduce democracy.

Third, there is a class struggle over redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001, 2006; Rosendorff, 2001; Boix, 2003, 2008; Ansell & Samuels, 2010). Existing political elites have incentives to introduce institutions that allow them to maintain their monopoly on political power while introducing democracy.

### 3. Gains and costs for each player and responses

#### 3.1. Gains and costs

The following shows the benefits and costs to the warring and neighboring countries and the United Nations.

**Table1.** Profit and Cost of Dictator

<b>Profit of Dictator</b>
1) Maintenance of power
2) Expansion of power (external: acquisition of territory through invasion)
3) Expansion of power ( Internal: strengthening the domestic support base.) Outside of military and non-military parties
<b>Cost of Dictator</b>
1) Cost of information disclosure to the enemy *If war can only be initiated by dictatorial or presidential authority, Dictator does not need consent in parliament. *If the consent of the National Assembly is required, the release of information on war preparations will be made public, which will also prepare the hypothetical adversary to defend itself against progress, thus reducing the probability of success associated with an invasion.
2) Cost of favoring parliamentary management (Dictator needs parliamentary support to wage war) *If a one-party dictatorship system, He needs political power of a dictator plus Own influence on base party x Ratio to opposing forces within the base party *If a multi-party system, he needs political power of a dictator plus Own influence over base party x Ratio of influence of opposing party over the base party in parliament *Replacement of the president through the deliberation of disapproval of the dictatorial president or a decision on a parliamentary-led ceasefire.
3) The cost of gaining support from one's citizens (Promoting a war of aggression requires the legitimacy of the war of aggression and a high level of support from the public, including the families of soldiers fighting for the war of aggression.) *In the case of dictatorships, fabricated massacres of their people by a hypothetical enemy nation, etc., tend to be used as support and justification for their people for invasion. There have been several past cases of invasion for the protection of one's people on the grounds of massacres, discrimination, etc., including the civil war (Yihe Dan Incident) in the Qing Dynasty (present-day China) in 1900. In order to resolve the Yihe Dan Incident, a coalition of eight countries suppressed the civil war, and the Russian presence in Qing China even after the Yihe Dan Incident was suppressed was a factor in the Russo-Japanese War.
4) Cost of military coups *The decline in support for the president in the military as the war bogged down and casualties increased. An increase in the probability of a coup d'état by the military due to declining support.

*Factors that increase the probability of victory of a dictatorship after the outbreak of war*

The first is whether or not nuclear weapons are possessed. In the case of an invasion by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear power, the leaders of the nuclear power have an incentive to avoid entering the war to avoid nuclear war; the second is that the invaded country invades before forming a military alliance with neighboring countries. Although many states have

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incentives to join military alliances to deter the enemy camp, the incentives to engage in a war with another state may be scarce. Therefore, there is an incentive for members of military alliances to avoid joining military alliances of countries with high war risks.

*Neighboring or surrounding country*

*Strategy options based on gain/cost*

If the possibility of the threat of invasion of one's own country increases sufficiently in the event of occupation, then one enters the war. If the likelihood of invasion of the country is not sufficiently high in the medium to long term, then we will not enter the war. As long as the likelihood of invasion is low, we will limit ourselves to military and economic assistance to the invaded country. If the invaded country is recognized as a military ally, we will not join the alliance if the threat of war is more likely.

### 3.2. War objectives and ceasefire conditions for each party

#### War aims of dictators

It wants to create a military vacuum to avoid contact with its own country by a multinational enemy camp that possesses nuclear weapons. At the same time, they want to operate as a puppet government of a dictatorship and use it to protect the dictatorship politically as well. Since occupation is not possible given the current world situation and the UN Charter, we want to create a puppet government and provide political and economic support through that puppet government. We want to reduce the threat to our country through demilitarization.

*Conditions for a ceasefire in the country being invaded*

It is the maintenance of an independent state. To be an independent state in both name and reality, it is essential to possess military power. Acceptance of a demand from a dictatorship for neutralization and demilitarization is unacceptable because it means always running the risk of being invaded by a dictatorship under a puppet government.

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### 3.3. Response of each player

**Table 2.** *Common ways for dictators to gain the upper hand in a war*

1) Calls on neighboring countries to return territories previously controlled by dictatorships
2) Fabricated reports of massacres of their people by a hypothetical enemy nation
3) In the event of open war, we will secure allies in anticipation of economic sanctions and isolation of our economy from the global economy. *As part of the support for economic sanctions by allied countries, the company joined CIPS, which allows for settlement of allied currencies even if they are excluded from SWIFT, the dollar-settled international interbank market, but the effect is limited. *For banks wishing to settle in dollars in allied countries, economic support for dictatorships is limited because a major economic power in a neighboring country (the U.S.) has enacted a law punishing foreign companies whose governments have done business with sanctioned companies, nations, and individuals.
4) Various initiatives aimed at increasing foreign currency reserves to withstand economic sanctions
5) Expansion of military forces in anticipation of an invasion
6) Military exercises in the vicinity of a hypothetical enemy country
7) Decision to start a war in the Diet.
<b>Post-war of aggression</b>
8) In areas where massacres are alleged to have occurred in a hypothetical enemy country, influential people who support the dictator unilaterally declare independence. Saying, immediately, the dictatorship recognizes independence. The dictatorship deploys troops at the request of the independent states and in the name of protecting its citizens.
9) Invasion of areas other than those falling under
10) Cyber Attacks as Preparation for a Full Land Invasion
11) Invasion by the air force to secure air control
12) Demilitarization and neutralization and other ceasefire conditions
13) Destruction of military and infrastructure facilities and nuclear power plants by both air and ground forces
14) Indiscriminate bombing of major cities by missiles and other means from air forces and dictators. *The 1994-1996 Chechen conflict killed 30,000 people or about 10% of the population of a city of 300,000. *They carried out indiscriminate attacks trying to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria.
15) Announced readiness to use nuclear weapons to avoid intervention by other countries
16) Aiming to control major cities
17) Ceasefire talks. Even if a ceasefire resolution is passed, the attack is aimed at the gap where the enemy's resistance is weakened by the ceasefire resolution. Nullify ceasefire talks.
18) Order to stop foreign media from disseminating information about the war and invasion in order to hide the truth from their citizens.
19) Enactment of a law that allows the public and foreign media to be severely punished if they are deemed to be disinformation.
20) Consent to secure routes (humanitarian corridors) for the escape of civilians from the conflict area in order to stop attacks on civilians. After consent, the dictatorship attacks the humanitarian corridors. *Attacks on civilians are perceived by the dictatorship as an effective way for the leaders of a democratic state elected by its citizens to surrender.
21) Defense against indiscriminate attacks on civilians and criticism of indiscriminate attacks by the international community.
22) Increase in armaments by neighboring countries to increase deterrence
23) Wealthy in dictatorships speak out against economic sanctions on dictatorships
24) Attacks aimed at shutting down nuclear power plants and exposing the public to radiation
25) Armed attack on the domestic media of the invaded country
26) A simultaneous attack on the capital of the invaded country



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**Table 3.** *Response of the invaded country*

1) Application for membership in a multinational coalition force (NATO) with military capabilities
2) Acceptance of Volunteer Soldiers
3) Arms to the People
4) Application for membership in the Economic Union (EU)
5) Requested the military alliance (NATO) to secure airspace control and establish a no-fly zone that would lead to attacks on the air forces of dictatorships in response to attacks to secure airspace control of dictatorships and bombing of major cities.
6) Agreeing with the dictator to negotiate with the dictator to secure routes for the escape of civilians from the conflict area to stop attacks on civilians.

**Table 4.** *Response of Neighboring Countries*

1) Rejection of request for a military alliance
2) Rejection of military alliance
3) Implementation of economic sanctions
4) Military assistance to invaded countries
5) Increase in the country's military buildup
6) Acceptance of Economic Union (EU) Provided thousands more weapons, including tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-tank shells.
7) Economic Union (EU) generates a budget for arms procurement from peacekeeping funds and provides
8) NATO deploys the National Rapid Reaction Force (NRF) to enhance NATO's deterrence capabilities
9) Sanctions and clampdowns on emerging conglomerates and wealthy individuals in dictatorships
10) Consideration of introduction of state-of-the-art weaponry and revival of conscription in response to the doubling of defense spending by economic powers in neighboring countries *Europe's economic powers had restrained their military budgets because of their pacifism. However, they have decided to approximately double their military budgets. They have come up with a plan to renew all of their current mainstay weapons, which were imported about 40 years ago, with the latest weapons. *Citizen support for conscription and increased defense spending exceeded opposition by about half.
11) Neighboring countries were increasing their economic dependence on the dictatorship in the area of lifelines. Shifted to less dependence on dictatorships to protest wars of aggression
12) In presidential elections in neighboring countries, support is also higher for leaders who take a firm stand against dictatorships.
13) Neighboring countries prepared to enter the war as a single nation, not as a coalition with a functioning military alliance.
14) Reduction or suspension of imports and exports from or to dictatorships
15) Military superpowers capable of opposing dictatorships decide to station troops in the next country they are likely to invade after they have conquered the current invader.
16) Rejected request to establish military alliance (NATO) flight airspace control *In effect, NATO's military power is the U.S. military, so the downing of a dictatorship's air force by the U.S. military is rejected, fearing that it could lead to World War III. Western nations are unable to resolve conflicts arising in their regions on their own without U.S. forces. *In the Bosnian Civil War, the U.S. bombed the positions of Serbian armed groups in Serbia, which did not possess nuclear weapons, leading to a ceasefire agreement. In the Kosovo conflict, NATO bombed Serbia and Kosovo in response to the Serbian president's attack on Kosovo.
17) If a neighboring country supports military assistance such as fighter jets to an invaded country, a superpower capable of opposing a dictatorship decides to indirectly provide military assistance to the neighboring country.

**Table 5.** *UN Response*

1) UN resolution to determine if there is a violation of the UN Charter
2) The Security Council resolution to deploy UN troops is deliberated but is rejected through the veto of a permanent member of the Security Council, the dictatorial state.

*Response of invaded citizens*

The civilian population of the aggressor country is also resisting the dictatorship. Recognizing that not only military personnel and military installations are targets, but also civilians, many civilians volunteer to defend their country.

*Citizens' Response to Dictatorships*

Ordinary citizens of a dictatorship also resist the dictatorship. The dictatorship not only controls information on the war against the domestic media but also controls information on the war by the foreign media through laws and regulations so that the public will not know that the war is a unilateral war of aggression. Foreign media report on the bombings of civilian targets in the invading country, the progress of the war, and the response of neighboring countries. Citizens, however, learn about the information through the Internet, and civilian demonstrations grow as the war drags on.

**Table 6.** *Allies Respond to Dictatorships*

1) Economic Support for Dictatorships
2) Suggestions for possible involvement as an arbitral tribunal
3) Establishment of a possible funds settlement system between allies and dictatorships
4) Allies themselves begin preparing for war (because of the dispersion of military power among neighboring countries in support of dictatorships)
5) Control of areas that threaten civil unrest within the allied country (dispersing criticism of the dictatorship's war of aggression by exposing the allied country to international criticism)
6) Allies themselves carry out wars of aggression

**4. Model**

The strategic option for an invaded country is to fight/surrender. In practice, the advantage is that through surrender, the number of deaths is reduced, but the increase in casualties is not taken into account. The loss of independence by one's people may lead to the deprivation of freedom and human rights. In addition, in practice, there are calls for assistance to other countries, etc. This study includes the participation of other countries in the war. Strategic options for a dictatorship include fighting (invading only some areas, invading the entire country, invading the entire country and using nuclear weapons), fighting

Not to fight. The strategic options for other countries are to intervene (with the threat of nuclear war), not intervene militarily but implement economic sanctions, military assistance, or do nothing, but the gains and costs associated with the actions of other countries are simplified by including them in the gains and costs of the dictatorial state and the invaded country. Strategic options for allies include providing economic support or not providing economic support along with the alliance.

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However, the model is simplified by including the gains and costs associated with the actions of intermediary countries in the gains and costs of the dictatorship and the invaded country. Military alliances have the strategic option of entering or not entering the war. Civilians have the strategic option to rebel or not to rebel. The UN Security Council has the strategic option to veto or not to veto.

### 4.1. Invasion to protect the residents

*Despotism*

*No war*

$$R_r - k_r$$

The dictator gains  $R_r$  through the maintenance of power;  $k_r$  is the threat of arming countries close to the dictatorship and the associated cost of military buildup.

*War (invasion to protect the residents)*

An invasion into pro-dictatorship areas to protect the population of a settlement is subject to criticism from the international community, but is unlikely to result in intervention by other countries or damaging economic sanctions.

$$R_r + \theta_r(k_{r,p})[B_{r,p} - k_{r,p}] + (1 - \theta_r(k_{r,p}))[-k_{r,p}]$$

$\theta_r$  is the probability of victory for a dictatorship,  $B_{r,p}$  is the gain from war, and  $k_{r,p}$  is the cost paid through war.  $\theta_r$  is a decreasing function of  $k_{r,p}$ . As the cost of war increases, the probability of victory decreases. This does not include the cost of building up the dictatorship's war preparations. It means the increase in dictatorship casualties associated with invasion and the cost of war in wartime.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,p})} < 0$$
$$k_r < k_{r,p}$$

*Countries invaded*

*Resist*

$$R_u + \theta_u(k_{r,p})[B_{u,p} - k_{u,p}] + (1 - \theta_u(k_{r,p}))[-k_{u,p}]$$

*Surrender*

$$-k_{u,p}$$

$R_u$  is the gain associated with maintaining the regime in the invaded country;  $\theta_u$  is the probability of victory for the invaded country;  $B_{u,p}$  is the

gain from the war; and  $k_{u,p}$  is the cost paid through the war. For the invaded country, even if it wins the war, it will not gain much since it will only be protected from maintaining its pre-war status as an independent state, but the gain in  $B_{u,p}$  is positive to show the difference between winning and losing the war. The probability of victory  $\theta_u$  of the invaded state is an increasing function of the cost  $k_{r,p}$  of the dictatorship. The probability of winning the cost of invasion increases as the war cost of the dictatorship increases.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,p})} > 0$$

### 4.2. Invasion of the whole country

The purpose of a total land invasion is for a dictatorship to create a puppet government by demanding that the invading country demilitarize and neutralize itself. Demilitarization allows the dictatorship to invade at any time. Neutralization assures the dictatorship that it is not part of the enemy camp while showing that it is politically neutralizable. On the other hand, it makes it possible to belong politically and militarily to one's camp. The essential objective is to reduce the threat to the country by establishing a puppet government and creating a military vacuum between the dictatorship and the enemy camp or a state that belongs to the home camp. It is desirable to avoid having a country bordering a dictatorship belong to a powerful enemy camp.

The side of the country being invaded will cease to be an independent country. The creation of a puppet government of another country means the deprivation of the freedoms and rights of the people belonging to the nation, and there is a strong possibility that the invaded country will become a bulwark against the dictatorship, becoming the stage for a proxy war between the two sides.

The concepts of short-term and long-term are also important.

In the case of a war based on a short-term decisive battle, the country is not subject to simultaneous attacks from multiple locations or intervention by other countries, so it can take the initiative in attacking and can defeat each side individually.

However, if the war is prolonged, it will not only be necessary to secure supply lines, but it will also result in economic damage from economic sanctions, the rise of domestic opposition groups, counterattacks from multiple sides in the invading country, and guerrilla warfare by the invading country's citizens. By reducing the probability of victory due to the dispersion of forces of its armed forces, and by causing the dispersal and deployment of military equipment in anticipation of possible intervention by other countries, the country will not only lose the initiative but will also become the target of individual attacks.

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### 4.2.1. Short-term invasion of the entire land

In the short term, the probability of victory of the dictatorship is high. If the invasion of the whole country is completed in the short term, the conditions at the time of ceasefire are better)

*Despotism*

*War (invade the whole country)*

$$R_r + \theta_r(k_{r,all})[B_{r,all} - k_{r,all}] + (1 - \theta_r(k_{r,all}))[-k_{r,all}]$$

$$k_{r,all} > k_{r,p}$$

$$B_{r,all} > B_{r,p}$$

$B_{r,all}$  is the dictatorship's gain from a full invasion and  $k_{r,all}$  is the cost of a full invasion.

The benefits and costs associated with a full-scale invasion of a dictatorship are greater than those associated with the invasion of some areas to protect the residents of a settlement.

*No war (only partial suppression to protect the residents of the settlement)*

$$R_r + \theta_r(k_{r,p})[B_{r,p} - k_{r,p}] + (1 - \theta_r(k_{r,p}))[-k_{r,p}]$$

Consistent with the expected gains at the time of the invasion to protect the residents of the reservations.

*Countries invaded*

*Resist*

$$R_u + \theta_u(k_{u,all})[B_{u,all} - k_{u,all}] + (1 - \theta_u(k_{u,all}))[-k_{u,all}]$$

$$k_{u,all} > k_{u,p}$$

$$B_{u,all} > B_{u,p}$$

$B_{u,all}$  is the benefit of a total land invasion and  $k_{u,all}$  is the cost of a total land invasion.

For the invaded country, if the invasion is a partial invasion to protect its residents, it will remain profitable if it survives as an independent country in the remaining areas, even if it loses some areas. However, if the country is defeated in a full invasion, it ceases to be an independent country and no governmental interests remain. The cost of defeat in a full invasion is greater than the cost of defeat in a partial invasion to protect the population.

*Surrender*

$$-R_u - k_{u,all}$$

$R_u$  includes the entire benefit of retaining an independent country, in addition to the benefits of the person in charge of the government of the

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invaded country. Therefore,  $-R_u$  includes not only the loss of regime change through the surrender of the invaded country but also the disadvantages associated with becoming a puppet government and depriving the entire population of its freedoms and human rights as an independent country. Since a dictatorship is run for the benefit of the individual dictator and his entourage, and since it is easy to start a war,  $R_r$  represents only the interests of the individual dictator and his entourage, whereas  $R_u$  for the country being invaded includes the interests of the entire sovereign nation because it is a democratic state.

### 4.2.2. Prolonged invasion of the entire land

Prolonged invasion decreases the probability of victory of the dictatorship and tends to worsen conditions at the time of cease-fire.

#### *Despotism*

*War (invade the whole country)*

$$R_r + \theta_r(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})[B_{r,all} - (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})] \\ + (1 - \theta_r(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out}))[-(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})]$$

$k_{r,out}$  is the cost to the dictatorship of prolonged war. It is the cost associated with resistance to the dictatorship, such as economic sanctions, acceptance of volunteer troops into the invaded country, and military assistance from other countries.

*No war (accept ceasefire talks)*

$$R_r + B_{r,st} - k_{r,all} \\ B_{r,all} > B_{r,st}$$

$B_{r,st}$  is the cost associated with being invaded throughout the country and prolonged. different from the gains from victory in a short-term war.

With prolonged dictatorships, the dictatorship receives smaller gains than in the case of a short-term victory in a full-scale invasion, because it is more likely to reach a compromise if it agrees to cease-fire talks.

#### *Countries invaded*

*Resist*

$$R_u + \theta_u(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})[B_{u,all} - k_{u,all}] + (1 - \theta_u(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out}))[-k_{u,all}]$$

For the invaded country, if the battle is for its existence as an independent country, the cost of losing by defeat is consistent in the short and long term. Assume that the short-run and long-run costs coincide. The government and leaders of the invaded country, which is a democracy, may be more likely to agree to a ceasefire the greater the damage to civilians. Damage to civilians is likely to be greater the longer the war is protracted. However, the costs in this study do not include the

psychological costs to governments and leaders associated with harm to civilians.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})} < 0$$

The more the cost of a dictatorship increases, the lower the probability of victory for the dictatorship.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})} > 0$$

The probability of victory for the invaded country increases as the cost of the dictatorship increases. Also, in the case of a war between two countries, if one side wins, the other side will naturally lose.

$$\theta_u = (1 - \theta_r)$$

Prolonged war reduces the probability of victory for the dictatorship from No invasion by a dictatorship and the invaded country is more likely to maintain its independence.

$$\frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})}} > \frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all})}}$$

*Surrender*

$$-R_u - k_{u,all}$$

### 4.3. Prolonged invasion of the entire land + entry of nuclear powers into the war

If a dictatorship suffers a certain level of defeat in military operations, use of nuclear weapons (increase in the probability of nuclear use) = lower benefits and higher costs when a dictatorship uses nuclear weapons.

*Despotism*

*War (invade the whole country)*

$$R_r + \theta_r (\alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})) [B_{r,all} - \alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})] + (1 - \theta_r (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})) [-\alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})]$$

$k_{r,nu}$  is the cost to the dictatorship of receiving entry into the war of another state.  $\alpha$  is the probability that the dictatorship will use nuclear weapons to win, since both the dictatorship fears a nuclear first strike when a nuclear power enters the war and the probability of victory decreases due to costs such as troop dispersion as a response to another state. Above a

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certain cost  $\bar{k}$ , the dictatorship state will execute the use of nuclear weapons.

$$\alpha > 1 \text{ if } k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu} > \bar{k}$$

$$\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial \alpha} > 0$$

If a dictatorship is forced to incur costs above a certain level, the probability of using nuclear weapons increases. When nukes are used, the probability of victory is high.

$$\frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})} > 0$$

*No war (accept ceasefire talks)*

$$R_r + B_{r,st} - k_{r,all} - k_{r,nu}$$

*Countries invaded*

*Resist*

$$R_u + \theta_u (\alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})) [B_{u,all} - k_{u,all}] + (1 - \theta_u (\alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu}))) [-k_{u,all}]$$

Decreased probability of victory due to increased costs on the part of the dictatorial state (damage from economic sanctions, cost of securing supply lines and dispersion of troops); increased probability of victory due to increased benefits on the invaded state (increased economic and military support from other states and increased domestic volunteer forces)

Once the troops of the dictatorship have been withdrawn to the point where the probability of nuclear use is not too high, cease-fire talks are necessary on the condition that the independent country is maintained. The conditions for a ceasefire could include the assurance by the military alliance of the enemy camp and the invaded country that it will not belong to the enemy camp in most cases, and that it will not leave the entire invaded country as a military vacuum zone, but will leave the border area as a military vacuum zone.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial \alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})} < 0$$

The more the cost of a dictatorship increases, the lower the probability of victory for the dictatorship.

$$\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial \alpha (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})} > 0$$



$$\frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial \alpha(k_{r,all}+k_{r,out}+k_{r,nu})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial \alpha(k_{r,all}+k_{r,out}+k_{r,nu})}} > \frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all}+k_{r,out}+k_{r,nu})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all}+k_{r,out}+k_{r,nu})}} > \frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all}+k_{r,out})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all}+k_{r,out})}} > \frac{\frac{\partial \theta_u}{\partial (k_{r,all})}}{\frac{\partial \theta_r}{\partial (k_{r,all})}}$$

**Surrender**

$$-R_u - k_{u,all}$$

#### 4.4. Prolonged invasion of the entire land + participation of non-nuclear powers or participation as individual states rather than at the military alliance level (NATO)

Even if a dictatorship suffers a certain level of defeat in a military operation, the probability of using nuclear weapons is zero.

*Despotism*

*War (invade the entire country)*

$$R_r + \theta_r(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})[B_{r,all} - (k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})] + (1 - \theta_r)(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})[-(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})]$$

Reasons why the possibility of using nuclear weapons increases for dictatorships when a nuclear power enters the war: nuclear weapons are effective in a first-strike situation.

and if used in the vicinity of an enemy leader's area of residence, the death of the enemy leader would likely prevent the war from being carried out. A direct attack on nuclear power could result in nuclear retaliation and possibly nuclear war. However, leaders of dictatorships know that democracies may not be able to stay in power if they are criticized for using nuclear weapons. Because democracies fear nuclear war, they are more likely to believe that a single use of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear state is likely to be met with no repercussions and that they will be better able to advance ceasefire talks by carrying out the more militarily effective threat of using nuclear weapons than a democratic state.

The use of nuclear weapons is more likely to come not from a dictatorial state, but as an ally against an aggressor. By insisting that it is not its nuclear use, it hopes to avoid deadly economic sanctions and reduce the damage to its subsequent international political activities (G7 and suspension of its permanent membership).

Nuclear-using countries have an incentive to avoid launching nuclear weapons from their own countries because of the possibility of nuclear retaliation.

*No war (accept ceasefire talks)*

$$R_r + B_{r,st} - k_{r,all} - k_{r,nu}$$

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*Countries invaded*

*Resist*

$$R_u + \theta_u(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})[B_{u,all} - k_{u,all}] + (1 - \theta_u(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu}))[-k_{u,all}]$$

*Surrender*

$$-R_u - k_{u,all}$$

### 4.5. Economic sanctions against dictatorships and economic support for dictatorships through allies

*Despotism*

Dictatorships are subject to economic sanctions, but with allies, the cost of dictatorships is less than positive, the continuation of the war would be possible in the long run.

$$-P_r + I_c$$

$P_r$  is the cost to the dictatorship of economic sanctions and  $I_c$  is the support to the dictatorship by its allies.

An ally of a dictatorship state can be expected to serve as an arbitrator as well as to provide economic support to the dictatorship state. On the other hand, if the country is very close politically and economically to the dictatorship, the optimal action for an ally would be to announce domestically and internationally that the ally is about to invade another country to avoid concentrating international condemnation on the dictatorship, entering the war against the dictatorship and increasing military support for the invaded country. The global expansion of the fear of developing into a world war differs from the scale required to enter a war against only dictatorships and to go to war with other countries in preparation for a world war. Leaders of neighboring countries can discourage participation in or military support for dictatorships because they will need more military buildup in the immediate future to prepare for a world war. This is effective military support for dictatorships. In addition, if a dictatorship controls an aggressor nation, the fact is that a nuclear power with veto power will be allowed to wage a war of aggression to a certain degree. In such a case, the allies would be able to take the next step in their military buildup for deterrence.

It would justify the actual waging of a war of aggression, and it would also provide confidence to the leaders of the allied countries that even if they launched a war of aggression, it would not result in military intervention by other countries.

*Countries of Military Alliances*

If you're going to enter the race, you're going to have to

$$\theta_{eu}(k_{eu})[B_{eu} - k_{eu}(L_{EU})] + (1 - \theta_{eu}(k_{eu}))[-k_{eu}(L_{EU})]$$

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$\theta_{eu}$  is the probability of victory if the military alliance enters the war,  $k_{eu}$  is the cost of the military alliance's entry into the war, and  $B_{eu}$  is the benefit of victory.  $L_{EU}$  is the distance of the country in the military alliance that is geographically closest to the dictatorial state. The entry into the war as a military alliance assumes here that the dictatorship does not invade the military alliance or use nuclear weapons against the military alliance. Therefore, it is assumed that the regime of the military alliance is maintained regardless of whether it wins or loses the war.

If  $L_{EU} > 0$

If  $L_{EU} = 0$

$$\frac{\partial k_{eu}}{\partial L_{EU}} > 0$$

The greater the proximity to the enemy camp, the greater the likelihood of war. When a country bordering a dictatorship joins a military alliance, the distance  $L_{EU}$  from the dictatorship becomes zero, maximizing the cost of the military alliance. This requires countries to have the deterrence of war to avoid war through membership in a military alliance but to avoid participation in the war. Countries close to dictatorships or enemy camps will need to possess a military force that can counter the military power of the dictatorship or enemy camp on its own. If the people believe that defeat in the war would result in the loss not only of their independence but also of the human rights and freedoms of their people, an increase in military power would be acceptable to the Diet.

*Citizen*

If citizen in despotism don't revolt.

$$-(\theta_r x - y)$$

$x$  is the benefit that a dictator can gain for his citizens with the victory of a war. A dictatorship winning a war benefits from reduced military spending due to reduced threats to its dictatorship, which in turn benefits the private sector and social security through taxes.  $y$  is the cost that citizens incur as a result of the war. It includes the damage caused by increased soldier casualties, increased military spending, and economic sanctions.

If citizen in despotism want to revolt.

$$\theta_{r,c} \{-k_c - (\theta_r x - y) + R\} + (1 - \theta_{r,c}) D_c$$

$k_c$  is the cost of insurgency,  $\theta_{r,c}$  is the probability of victory during the insurgency, and  $D_c$  is the cost of failed insurgency. If the rebellion fails, it means being killed or punished;  $R$  is the benefit to the civilian side in the

event of a successful rebellion, such as reduced military spending due to political regime transition or the end of the war.

Even if they rebel, if the citizens are militarily strong enough to win a civil war against the military to the extent that the transition from a dictatorship to a substantial democratic system is achieved, then the transition to a democratic system, with the victory of the citizens over the military through civil war, will prevent the implementation of a war of aggression in the long term.

$$\theta_{r,c}\{-k_c - (\theta_r x - y) + R\} + (1 - \theta_{r,c})D_c > A_r$$

$A_r$  is the military force a dictatorship can move to put down an insurgency during a war of aggression. The above equation implies that the expected gain for civilian rebellion is greater than the expected gain for the dictatorship to suppress the rebellion based on the military power possessed by the dictatorship. It also means that the dictatorship may be overthrown through rebellion.

Although the citizens do not have the military strength to win a civil war against the military, the conditions under which a combination of demonstrations and expressions of disapproval of the current regime to the extent that the war of aggression is stopped can undermine the dictator's base of support and implement a cessation of the war of aggression are as follows.

$$C_r < \theta_{r,c}\{-k_c - (\theta_r x - y) + R\} + (1 - \theta_{r,c})D_c < A_r$$

$C_r$  represents the threshold of resistance that forces the dictatorship to abandon the war of aggression through peaceful criticism of the war by its citizens. The above equation implies that citizens have the power to renounce a war of aggression, but that they are not strong enough to overthrow a dictatorship.

#### *Despotism*

Expected gains from dictatorial states' suppression of civil uprisings

$$E = R_r + \theta_r \left\{ \alpha(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu}) [B_{r,all} - \alpha(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})] + (1 - \theta_r(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out})) [-\alpha(k_{r,all} + k_{r,out} + k_{r,nu})] \right\} + (1 - \theta_{r,cd})\{-k_{cd} + E\}$$

$\theta_{r,cd}$  is the probability of success of a dictatorship in suppressing a civil uprising,  $k_{cd}$  is the cost of suppressing the uprising;  $E$  depends on the timing of the civil uprising. The above formula for a dictatorship state against an aggressor state when the fear of nuclear war is included as an example, but the expected gains of the dictatorship state corresponding to the timing of citizen rebellion can be included. Assuming that the dictator's regime is replaced if the rebellion fails to be crushed,  $E$  also includes  $R_r$ .

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The probability of a successful rebellion increases as the dictatorship requires more costs associated with a prolonged war.

The probability of civilian victory is equal to the probability of failure by the dictatorship to put down a civilian rebellion.

$$\theta_{r,c} = 1 - \theta_{r,cd}$$

*UN Security Council*

Exercise or not exercise the right of veto

Benefits and costs of exercising

$$[B_n - k_n] < 0$$

If so, do not veto.

The advantage of exercising the veto over the deployment of UN forces in response to a war of aggression is the ability to avoid the deployment of one's troops. Deployment of troops for reasons that do not enjoy the support of the public could reduce the approval rating of the government of the home country. In addition, wars have financial costs.

The disadvantages of exercising the veto over the deployment of UN troops include the disruption of world order and the increased possibility of invasion of one's own country. It also increases the likelihood of increased aggression against one's own country by neighboring countries because it leads to the legitimization of aggression by other countries.

$$[B_n - k_n] > 0$$

If so, the veto is exercised.

$$[B_n + C_n - k_n] > 0$$

The only country that initiates a war of aggression that has the advantage of exercising the veto, other than the above, especially the advantage of  $C_n$  apart from the purpose of expanding its territory and invading to its advantage, is the country that is complicit in the war of aggression.

$$C_n > 0$$

For a country that initiated a war of aggression, it would naturally want to avoid intervention by UN forces, since UN forces would be on the enemy side if the UN General Assembly resolved that it was a war of aggression. For a dictatorial state, the advantages of exercising the veto are very high.

If even one country exercises its veto, it cannot deploy UN troops. Any party to a war of aggression that is found by the UN General Assembly to

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violate the UN Charter should relinquish or be deprived of the power to exercise the veto. The reason for this is that the deployment of UN forces is intended to deter war, parties to a war of aggression to decide whether they should deploy to deter war. If a country agrees to a ceasefire, the deployment of UN troops is unnecessary.

The UN veto was historically established as a method to prioritize cooperation among the major powers, based on the experience of the League of Nations' failure to stop World War II. The goal is to achieve world peace through the unanimous consent of the major powers.

However, allowing aggression by other countries in violation of the UN Charter creates the risk that aggression by war will become the norm. In such a case, the presence or absence of nuclear power could determine who wins or loses a war, and the risk of using nuclear weapons increases with each war. The result would also be an increase in the number of nuclear powers and the promotion of nuclear development. It promotes an arms race. Rather than avoiding a breakdown among the major powers, it brings about the risk of nuclear war, the risk of future world wars, an increase in puppet regimes, and an increase in dictatorships, authoritarian states, and military states that deny freedom and human rights. There is also a strong possibility of a return to imperialism. Parties to a war that has violated the UN Charter should not participate in any resolution to stop that war. We should focus solely on maintaining cooperation only among the major powers under circumstances that can be viewed objectively. If a party to a war that has violated the UN Charter is a permanent member of the Security Council, its veto power should be suspended and its participation in the Security Council is also undesirable. Unanimity among the major powers is not possible, and major UN resolutions should be passed only by those countries that abide by the UN Charter.

### 5. Conclusion of analysis

First, as long as the ceasefire condition is the abandonment of an independent state by a dictatorship or the retention of an independent state by an invaded state, ceasefire negotiations tend to be parallel unless a mediator is obtained; second, because democratic states require public consent before the decision to start the war, the obstacles to the start of the war. This is greater than in dictatorships. As a result, they tend to be able to respond only to risks that are more imminent for their countries than dictatorships. Third, the distance between a dictatorship and a country determines the decisions of its leaders. The greater the distance, the more likely it is to provide only economic assistance. The closer a country is to the point where it feels threatened if the occupation is tolerated, the more military assistance it will provide. Fourth, when a dictatorship initiates a war of aggression, neighboring countries tend to use economic sanctions to weaken the dictatorship's ability to wage war to avoid a major-power war. Fifth, it is essential to introduce a system in which the veto power of a permanent member of the UN Security Council is suspended if it violates

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the UN Charter or is a war party. The veto power was introduced based on the idea that cooperation among the major powers is indispensable for avoiding a world war. However, if a major power conducts a war of aggression, predicting that the other major powers fear a world war but are too afraid of it, which would not lead to a war among the major powers, it is necessary to dispatch a UN force. The emphasis on cooperation among the major powers may rather lead to the use of nuclear weapons by dictatorships and the spread of aggression around the world.

### 6. Discussion

The increase in the number of authoritarian states worldwide, especially those with permanent seats on the Council, has proven through the Ukraine crisis that it is likely to lead to a breakdown of international peace and international order that assumes no war.

To maintain the international order, the current UN and US-led international order need to be transformed. It is a reminder from World War I that the division of the great powers will lead to a world war. However, it is clear from history that the current invocation of the veto power by the permanent members of the UN Security Council prevents UN forces from intervening, resulting in the sacrifice of smaller countries. In the future, it will be difficult for the U.S. alone to intervene and lead the world to a ceasefire when it is difficult for UN forces to intervene. If the United States is allowed to use its nuclear weapons as a reason for advancing war to its advantage, it will be impossible to avoid the future promotion of nuclear weapons possession and proliferation by other nations.

Since the military power of the world's military superpowers cannot be expected, neighboring countries themselves strengthen their military capabilities. In addition, the leader of an invaded country is expected to be in the capital to inspire its citizens and military, but the leader of a dictatorship is likely to stay away from the capital and command from a nuclear shelter for fear of assassination. This is also a factor that can easily turn war into a nuclear war.

If, as a dictatorship, an ally is also a nuclear power and has veto power, the ally also has an incentive to wage a war of aggression. If an ally does wage a war of aggression, it is less likely to invite the intervention of other countries to avoid nuclear war. Nuclear and non-nuclear states have different thresholds for inviting direct military intervention by other states even if they wage a war of aggression, and if nuclear states wage a war of aggression but are not subject to military intervention, then even if they do wage a war of aggression, after several years after waging war on one country, other countries will also wage a war of aggression. This can lower the risk to the citizens of neighboring countries, thus advancing the war of aggression in their favor. In addition, locking a country out of the banking payment system as an economic sanction is of questionable effectiveness when the allied country is an economic power. That is, simple economic support would be huge, the value of imports and exports for the

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dictatorship would be very large, and a new settlement system in the currency of the allied or dictatorial country would reduce the damage for the dictatorial country.

Apart from the conclusions drawn from this study's model, we would like to propose the following reforms to the United Nations.

(1) Permanent United Nations Forces

Can intervene in areas of conflict not by a Security Council resolution but by a certain number of resolutions of the UN General Assembly

(2) volunteer soldier

Volunteer soldiers may intervene in conflicts of their own free will around the world and may be accepted at the free will of the parties to the conflict. However, volunteer soldiers who are available to act when the UN Charter is violated register with the UN as volunteer soldiers, and the UN provides information to the volunteer soldiers. Currently, volunteer soldiers must have military experience, but the registration system will make it easier for those who do not have military experience to register. The size of the volunteer force is expected to grow, and even if the UN, NATO, and the U.S. are unable to move against an aggressor state that violates the UN Charter, the force will act as a military deterrent against the aggressor state.

(3) Suspension of veto

States that violate the UN Charter, aggressor states that are resolved by the UN General Assembly to violate the UN Charter, and states that support aggressor states should lose their veto power over the war. By losing the veto, only states with veto power can implement Security Council resolutions and deploy UN forces.

(4) Wartime statements by dictators and leaders of invaded countries in the media should be made binding under international law.

For dictators, there is little incentive to defend their words and deeds, as long as their goal is to increase the probability of winning the war by catching the invading country and the international community off guard, such as not invading the entire country and not attacking its citizens. These words and deeds are used as tools to gain an advantage in the war, such as the sacrifice of civilians, the desire to advance ceasefire talks through the magnitude of civilian casualties, the delay of intervention by other countries, and the complete victory of the war such as a full-scale invasion in the meantime. The UN Charter, treaties, etc. should make them accountable for their words and actions and establish penalties not only for the aggressor country but also for the leaders themselves. Leaders of countries found to have violated the UN Charter should be required to appear before the UN in person and explain themselves as accused war criminals, even in times of war. It is essential to introduce a system similar to that used in democratic nations to interrogate members of parliament in parliament.

If the above situation does not progress, non-nuclear weapon states will always fear that nuclear weapons may be dropped on them unless they join



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a military alliance that includes nuclear weapon states or give up their sovereignty as independent states. This means that we are entering an era in which nuclear deterrence will not work. To be an independent state, it will be essential to either develop nuclear weapons or join the ranks of the nuclear powers. In addition, dictators are less likely to be controlled by others, including the people, and are therefore more capable than leaders of democratic states of acting based on their own emotions and desires. If such a dictator has the power of veto, he or she is more likely to be induced to wage a war of aggression. Without a system in which military sanctions are enforced even against countries with veto power, a global arms race and nuclear proliferation will continue.

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