https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/issue/feed 2026-03-14T18:45:41+00:00 Editorial journals@econsciences.com Open Journal Systems <p>^{JEPE (ISSN: 2148-8347) is published as four issues per year, March, June, September and December and all publication policies and processes are conducted according to the international standards. JEPE is an international, double-blind peer-reviewed, quarterly, open-access journal published by the Journals. JEPE accepts and publishes the research articles in the fields of economics, political economy, fiscal economics, applied economics, business economics, labour economics and econometrics. JEPE, without depending on any institution or organisation, is a non-profit journal that has an International Editorial Board specialists on their fields. Papers which are inappropriate to its scientific purpose, scope and fields are kindly rejected. It strictly depends on the scientific principles, rules and ethical framework that are required to this qualification. <strong>Continuous Publication Model:</strong> Econsciences Journals is published under the continuous publication model.}</p> https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2679 2026-01-12T19:40:34+00:00 Nadeem NAQVI naqvi@kimep.kz Eldar MADUMAROV madumarov@kimep.kz Henrik EGBERT henrik.egbert@hs-anhalt.de

<p>This paper analyzes the effects of a major exogenous shock, namely the influx of Russian migrants into Almaty, Kazakhstan following the 2022 Russia–Ukraine conflict, on the city’s restaurant industry. The sharp rise in housing demand significantly increased rents, which spilled over into commercial spaces and raised fixed costs for restaurants. Using a perfect competition framework, we examine how higher fixed costs affected market outcomes. The analysis predicts an initial decline in profits, followed by firm exit, reduced market supply, and higher meal prices. Empirical results are consistent with these predictions. The number of restaurants declined, prices increased, surviving restaurants served more customers, and total industry output fell. Beyond documenting these effects, the paper highlights the usefulness of highly stylized economic models in generating testable predictions under real world shocks. The findings contribute to understanding the economic consequences of sudden migration events and demonstrate the pedagogical value of applying theoretical models to complex real world settings.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Exogenous shock; Real estate rent; Restaurant industry; Kazakhstan; Russia–Ukraine conflict; Microeconomics teaching</p> <p><strong>JEL:</strong> D22; D40; F20; L83.</p>

2026-03-14T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2026 https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2712 2026-03-14T18:45:41+00:00 Đào PHU QUOC quocmina@gmail.com

<p>Public-sector wage reform in developing countries is constrained by limited fiscal space, persistent corruption incentives, and weak enforcement capacity. Conventional salary increases are fiscally costly, while enforcement-based anti-corruption strategies have shown limited long-term effectiveness. This paper proposes the Deferred Integrity Pay (DIP) model, a fiscally neutral wage reform framework that increases the lifetime value of civil-service compensation without increasing current government expenditure. The model restructures wages into three components: a basic monthly living wage, an integrity-contingent deferred account accumulated over the career, and a forfeiture condition triggered by confirmed corruption offenses. By integrating institutional economics and behavioral insights, particularly loss aversion and long - horizon incentives, the DIP framework realigns individual incentives toward integrity while preserving short-term fiscal discipline. The paper develops the conceptual architecture of DIP, analyzes its incentive effects, macro-fiscal implications, and governance externalities, and outlines a phased implementation strategy suitable for developing economies. DIP is proposed as a scalable institutional mechanism for reducing corruption, strengthening state capacity, and improving public-sector performance under binding fiscal constraints.</p> <p><strong>Keywords.</strong> Public sector reform; Deferred compensation; Anti-corruption; Fiscal neutrality; Institutional economics.</p> <p><strong>JEL. </strong>H11; H83; D73.</p>

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