Journal of Economics and Political Economy
https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE
<p><sup>JEPE (ISSN: 2148-8347) is published as four issues per year, March, June, September and December and all publication policies and processes are conducted according to the international standards. JEPE is an international, double-blind peer-reviewed, quarterly, open-access journal published by the Journals. JEPE accepts and publishes the research articles in the fields of economics, political economy, fiscal economics, applied economics, business economics, labour economics and econometrics. JEPE, without depending on any institution or organisation, is a non-profit journal that has an International Editorial Board specialists on their fields. Papers which are inappropriate to its scientific purpose, scope and fields are kindly rejected. It strictly depends on the scientific principles, rules and ethical framework that are required to this qualification.</sup></p>en-USJournal of Economics and Political Economy2148-8347<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc/4.0/88x31.png" alt="Creative Commons License" /></a><br />This article licensed under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" rel="license"> Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license (4.0)<br /></a>Front Matter
https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2489
<p>Front Matter</p>EconSciences Library
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2024-11-102024-11-10113iivGovernment finance and the demand for money: The relation between taxation and the acceptability of fiat money
https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2490
<p>Requiring taxes to be paid in domestic money provides a valuable characteristic for a state’s money. In the case of a state’s fiat money, it is the foundation for money demand and hence to the development of a financial system built around state money. Except for relatively highly taxed countries, where taxes may encourage tax avoidance and holding bank deposits, the level of taxation is a positive factor boosting financial development. Granger causality tests for 65 countries over the past half-century test the relationship between money and government finance. Except for the low-income countries, where there are only five with adequate data, the causal relationship between taxation and money demand is generally supported in the 60 countries making up the three higher income groups.</p> <p><strong>Keywords.</strong> Higher income groups; Goverment finance; Domand for Money; Taxation.</p> <p><strong>JEL. </strong>L82; L32; D73.</p>Mack OTTJohn A. TATOM
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2024-11-102024-11-101136786Is there a conflict of interest between Brazilian investment advisors and their clients? An econometric analysis from the perspective of the principal-agent problem
https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2491
<p>This paper investigates the Brazilian investment advisors' model of action. Starting from the principal-agent relationship, we sought to answer the following question: does the current Brazilian remuneration model for investment advisors reduce information asymmetry? For this, the theoretical model of Golec (1992) was adapted and panel data was used on Brazilian investment funds from 2010 to 2020. The results show that the current system of commissioning advisors does not reduce information asymmetry between investors and investment fund managers. Furthermore, given the large share of fixed-income funds in the Brazilian market, advisors do not have incentives to provide all the information they have to increase the profitability of investors' portfolios. These results are useful for the literature that studies the capital market by bringing empirical evidence to Brazil and financial market agents in general.</p> <p><strong>Keywords.</strong> Investment Funds; Investment Advisors; Principal-Agent; Information asymmetry.</p> <p><strong>JEL. </strong>G00; G23; C58; C51.</p>Alexandre Magno Andrade REIS Mathias Schneid TESSMANNGustavo José De Guimarães e SOUZA Marcelo De Oliveira PASSOS
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2024-11-102024-11-1011387103Kidney disease, donation, and transplantation in East Africa
https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JEPE/article/view/2492
<p>The burden of kidney failure remains largely underreported in East Africa. Health systems face numerous challenges including a lack of kidney registries, shortages of trained skilled healthcare workers, a lack of diagnostic support, a lack of equipment, and underdeveloped policies to govern the provision of treatment for kidney failure. Kidney transplantation, an effective treatment option against kidney failure, is underused primarily because of its cost and the lack of laws governing it. This paper discusses the salient issues affecting kidney donation and transplantation in East Africa.</p> <p><strong>Keywords.</strong> Risk factors; Kidney donation; Transplantation; Compensation to donors; Laws.</p> <p><strong>JEL. </strong>I10; I11; I18.</p>Peter Mpaka AYAMBA
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2024-11-102024-11-10113104120