

Journal of
Economic and Social Thought

www.kspjournals.org

Volume 7

September 2020

Issue 3

**Bribery game in government secondary schools in
Cameroon: An empirical investigation of
Banfield's model**

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Abstract. This paper analyzes the influence of bribery on the evaluation of students at the entrance and at the outlet of Government Secondary Schools (GSS) in Cameroon using the BANFIELD's model. The empirical evidence reveals that there is bribery at the entrance and at the outlet in GSS. So, students can be registered or pass an exam thanks to "gombo". The couples (student, teacher) and (student, secretary), respectively at the entrance and the outlet, are corrupt at a significant threshold of 5% and a P-value of 0%. In the first case corruption highlights that students are victims of adverse- selection and the principal of the school is victim of moral hazard. In the second, it suggests that the principal is not only victim of moral risk but also of adverse selection.

Keywords. Bribery, Government secondary schools, Banfield's model, Adverse selection, Moral hazard.

JEL. B52, F55, O17, O31, O33, O35, O43, P10, P14, P48.

1. Introduction

Up to the time when a huge scandal, popularly labeled in Cameroon as "l'eau" (exam questions obtained thanks to bribe before the date of examination) took place during the official exams of the Government Secondary School (GSS) by the end of 1980s, the Minister of National Education recognized the practices of bribery in the area of education. In fact, the successive regular scandal of those practices urged the Minister to clarify the public opinion through the National Television. Moreover, in 1993 - 1994, certain examiners subordinated the getting of an average mark in a subject to the offer of "gombo" (bribe) during the oral part of the advanced level examination. In order to annihilate the phenomenon of bribery in the advanced level examination the following year, the Minister canceled the oral part of the said examination. However most recently the corruption scandals during the July 2020 session of the

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Baccalaureat examination lead to the leakage of examination questions in physics and chemistry. These subjects are rescheduled on the 3 and 4 of August 2020.

Corrupt practices observed in the education system of Cameroon are also perceived in many other countries such as Kenya (Kimeu, 2013) and Niger (Diallo, 2013), Vietnam (Chow *et al.*, 2013). For example in the last country during a recent online survey carried out by the Dan tri journal in which almost 20,000 persons participated, 62% of the parents admitted that they used their personal knowledge or paid money to enroll their children in the schools of their choice.

Generally, the perverse effects of these practices in the education sector based on the economy are numerous. Gupta *et al.*, (2002) established that the rate of school drop out is five times higher than that of countries where corruption is higher than in the countries where it is weak. By studying a sample of 50 countries, Francis Huang (2008) found that the higher the rate of perception of corruption the more the academic results are poor.

In order to confront this phenomenon, several studies were carried out in the last decades by the World Bank, transparency international and several universities based on the popular definition that corruption is the use of public resources for private purposes. In this framework, some authors, such as Diallo (2013), Ngwé (2013) and Leach (2013) studied petit corruption that involves individuals at all levels of the education system and small sums. Other authors notably Mauro (1997), Tanzi & Davoodi (1997) examined the practices of “grand” corruption involving top decision makers and important amounts of money. For example, Mauro (1997) established that corruption reduces education expenses including those of organisation of examinations because it is not easily involve in corrupt practices to the benefit of top civil servants in charge of sharing the budget among the different sectors of the economy.

Those studies are important since they have enabled to improve the strategies of the fight against corruption. In particular they enabled to know that by institutionalizing the right of the population to information on activities carried out by government agents in the education sector, the later will tend to behave better. But, it remains limited because of the absence of knowledge on the origin of phenomenon, in particular small corruption. In fact, if theoretical literature offers a more detailed insight (Lui, 1985; Kaufman & Wei, 1999) into the specific situations, empirical literature, on the other hand remains limited.

In 2011, within the framework of a book titled “the perception of governance and integrity in Cameroon: a quantitative study based on the results of the statistical survey of households in Cameroon”, The National Institute of Statistics of that country uses its own survey on households to determine the percentage of households which pay non regulatory fees according to different regimes or solicit the intervention of top personalities for the success of their children in exams. More precisely, the institute reveals that the percentage of persons who have taken normal exams or

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competitive entrance exams in the last 12 months before the survey was 3.1%. In reference the last exams taken and passed, 3.3% of those involved claim to have given bribe so as to benefit from the intervention of an authority to succeed. This practice is common in 50% of the 12 regions of Cameroon. However, it is higher in three regions littoral (excluding Douala), Far north and in Yaoundé with proportions of 16%, 9% and 6.4% respectively. Also this practice seem to concern mostly users who are not poor.

One of the loopholes of this study is that it does not give information on the consequences of corrupt practices. More precisely, on the supply side this study does not mention the victims of moral hazard. For example the Minister of secondary education who appointed the principal of government secondary schools does not know that he collected bribe from parents (before admitting their children).

In addition, on the demand side it remains silent on the victims of adverse selection, notably the fact that some parents give bribe to principals to obtain certificates but do not know that the certificates are fake.

The objective of this article is to bridge this gap based on the idea of Bandfield (1975) who thinks that corruption is possible as long as there are three types of stakeholders: the mandate (top hierarchy), a mandatory (head of institution) and a third party whose gains and losses depend on the other stakeholders. If with the help of information asymmetry the mandatory collects bribe from users (parents of students) in exchange for the success of their children the third party is victim of moral hazard.

Moreover, if in exchange for the offering of a bribe the users obtains an poor quality certificate from the principal, then he is a victim of adverse selection. The basic hypothesis of this paper is that bribery and specially petty bribery¹ (Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988) often influences the evaluation of students.

Frankly speaking, the functioning of the GSS has been profoundly influenced by bribery. This behavior has a negative impact on the evaluation of students. a) At the entrance, bribery has greatly influenced the decisions of recruitment of students in the GSS. b) At the outlet, bribery has determined students' access to higher classes. As a consequence, the credibility of the entire educational system is undermined by bribery.

The second section will be a review of the literature on the mechanisms and factors causing bribery in the educational studies. The third section will be a reminder of the teachings of Banfield's model (1975). The fourth section will deal with the typological description of the practices of bribery. In the fifth section we analyze the repercussions of these practices in GSS. In the sixth section we draw conclusions.

¹ The literature review distinguishes petty of bureaucratic corruption and grand or political corruption.

2. Literature review

In the economic analysis of crime, the individual weighs the costs and the benefits of a loyal act, and compare them to those of disloyal act, and then choose the one that maximizes his own interests (Becker, 1968). So, the economic agent chooses to corrupt when this act is advantageous to him. The initiative for such an action can either come from the agent, the user or the both (Yamb & Bayemi, 2015).

However, in the field of education, it is more likely for an agent to take initiative for corrupt action than the user in so far as the state agent has, monopoly and discretion power on applications and on decisions he takes, and less responsibility for results (Klitgaard, 1989). Monopoly creates opportunities for corruption by limiting the ability of citizens to choose other providers of education services. If the government is the only provider of educational services, students and their parents may be forced to pay bribes for access. Discretion refers to the autonomy enjoyed by a state official in decision making. Teachers and lecturers can abuse their power by selling information on examination, soliciting bribes in exchange of good grades (Meier, 2013). Das *et al.*, (2004) showed that in Zambia, the fixed allowance reached more primary schools than the discretionary subsidy to schools by local authorities (90 % against less than 20%).

Responsibility can be considered as the requirement that educational managers are accountable for the results they get. Lack of accountability creates opportunities for corruption (Yamb & Bayemi, 2015).

Cultural aspects can also favor the taking of initiative for corrupt action. In fact, in many countries, parents and students make gifts for teachers as a token of their gratitude. This poses no problem as long as no benefit is expected in return. But this practice can turn into extortion and parents who are not rich may feel that their children do not receive proper education or fail their exams because they cannot afford to make gifts or to pay bribes to teachers or lecturers (Meier, 2013; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Besides that, countries whose social norms are not based on meritocracy often face academic corruption. Corruption adversely affects the principles of merit, fairness and impartiality where education is grounded because some tax payers or consumers of educational services will receive preferential treatment. Those in power and owners of resources try to capture the benefits of education for themselves and their families. Elites tend to reproduce existing power relations through education, often using corrupt practices (Transparency International, 2013). For example, in these societies, a person can obtain a diploma or a promotion simply because he/she belongs to a certain family without this causing any protest (Michelsen Institute, 2006). That's the case in Cameroon where the success in some competitive exams namely those related to public service obeys at 90 % to the intervention of the authority (Institut national de la Statistique, 2011). Good students who are not favored fail.

According to Meier (2004), there is clear relation between corruption and economic factors such as inadequate wages. Those factors can push agents

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to initiate corrupts acts. Indeed, the low wages in the public service, including in educational system, largely explain the trivialization of small corruption (Beley & McLaren, 1993). Inadequate and irregular wages or accumulated of debts often push teachers to seek additional income. The teacher can collect bribes to give a good grade because his salary alone does not allow him to make ends meet (Vian, 2006). Salary increase is often used as a strategy aim at reducing the financial pressure that leads to corruption. Unfortunately, it is not enough to increase salary to end corruption. Increase of Wages reduces the attraction to bribes without deleting them. As a matter of fact, a high salary may lead to the cancellation or reduction of bribes requested by a teacher who was in need; however, greed could push the teacher to collect more (Rose-Ackerman, 1998).

3. Banfield's model

Education is important for the entire community. In active life, repeated dismissals of employees for incompetence in companies are a nuisance to the regularity of production and consequently reduce general welfare. The education therefore produces positive external effects which justify partial or total public financing. That is why the Ministry of National Education uses to educate and train the youth. It entrusts this mission to the teaching staff in its broad meaning (principal of school teachers, etc.). Parents who entrusts their children to the teaching staff expect their offspring to be teaching personal and thereby the Government. The relationships between the teaching personal, the government and students and thus parents permit to define GSS as set of contracts generated by the extension of government authority. Banfield's (1975) is of the opinion that this kind of extension creates new circumstances and incitement to bribery that may be studied through the principal-agent model (Akerloff, 1970; Ross, 1973). This author thinks that bribery is possible whenever there are three types of economic intervening parties. A principal, an agent and a third person whose profits and losses depend on the agent. An agent becomes corrupted if he sacrifices the interest of his principal for his profit and hence violates the law. In all cases, the profits and losses of the third party may be analyzed in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard.

If the agent does dissimulate his bribery from his hierarchy and illegally satisfies the interest of his principal, what Banfield terms official bribery, the victim of moral hazard will no more be the principal but the third party. This is true because of the disregard of the engagements between the principal and the third party as a result of the tacit contract binding them. According to Banfield, if the agent knows the quality of commodities or services that he provides to the third person and the latter doesn't know it at all, then knowledge about the commodities or services is said to be asymmetrically shared. Be it within the framework of personal bribery or official bribery, the third party is a victim of adverse selection because he cannot observe the quality of a commodity or service provided to him.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. Description of the Cameroon educational system

Heritage of the double domination of French and English the Cameroon Educational System is heterogeneous. Here we have GSS and Private Secondary Schools. Despite these diversities, the educational system is determined by the state which for instance gives out the modalities of evaluation of students during final year examinations.

In 1999, Cameroon population was evaluated at 15 million (56% of the population was less than 20 years while the population from 6 to 14 years represented 25.1% of the whole population). Its educational system (except universities) measured 2591255 students where 71% was from the public sector and 29% from the private sector. In 1985-1986, the public sector controlled 62.5% of the students population as against 37.5% in the private sector. In the same light in 1997, 8964 schools existed. Of this number 29.4% were from the private sector and 70.53% where from the public sector divided into primary and secondary schools. As concerns the secondary schools which is the objective of our investigations, it is made up of Government General Schools (colleges, high schools) and Government Technical and Commercial Schools, Rural Animation Centers and Home Economic Centers. In 1985-1986, the public sector represented 67, 14% of schools as against 32,36% for the private sector. From 1985-1997, the public sector students population increased at a rate of 8,5%. This evolution can be explained by the economic crisis which affected the country since 1986 hence reducing the purchasing powers of Cameroonians. This therefore caused some of the parents to withdraw their children from Private Schools which are more expensive and register them in Government Schools which are almost free. Unfortunately, the free education expected by Cameroonians has never been given to them.

4.2. Methodology of the investigation

The sample size was constituted by individuals divided in four categories: students' parents, students, teachers and principals of school living in the two main cities of Cameroon: Yaounde and Douala. But unfortunately the principals of schools refused answering our questions due to their fear of being identified. Of the 7000 students (3000 in Yaounde and 4000 in Douala) in GSS interviewed respectively in 7 secondary schools for Yaounde and 5 for Douala, 550 teachers (200 in Yaounde in 5 secondary schools and 350 in Douala in 7 secondary schools). 450 parents (250 in Douala and 200 in Yaounde), we respectively received 580, 350 and 34 questionnaires dully filled and validated.

We selected a sample in order to assure the best possible precision of the results of average cost. The method of sampling retained is based on the targeted population. The method consisted in questioning students and teachers at the entrance and at the outlet in the government schools, the parents were questioned at their residence. As to what concerns the

geographical dispersion of the individuals interviewed, the ideal aspect is that most of them are located in urban areas because the GSS in the rural areas do not always have the problem of plethoric population. However, we even wanted to equally visit the rural areas but given our limited means, we only limited our survey in the two main cities of Cameroon, Yaounde and Douala. Corrupters and corrupted avoid to be identified because bribery is forbidden by the law. So, it was quite impossible to ask them questions directly. But, we asked questions to individuals who were very familiar with the behavior of the corrupter and the corrupted. For instance, we questioned the students' parents, the students about bribery realized by others students' parents, the students about bribery practiced by others students, the teachers about others students, and so on. In order to measure the individuals' opinions vis-à-vis of bribery, we use the five categories of answers according to Likert' scale: strongly agree, agree, no opinion, not disagree, strongly disagree. The choices of the different categories of answers were later analyzed through by the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov.

5. Results and analysis

During our investigations we identified two types of bribery: bribery at the entrance and bribery at the outlet. The first one relates to the set of corruptive practices which permit a student to be admitted in GSS. The second one refers to a set of corruptive practices permitting a student to pass to higher class, to obtain a final year certificate during official exams, or obtain marks during practical exams.

5.1. Bribery at the entrance

We can summarize results concerning bribery at the entrance in two tables. The first one refers to different levels of bribery in relative and absolute values. The second one relates to the summarizing table of the Kolmogorov statistics from table 1.

Table 1. *Different levels of bribery according to Likert' scale*

| Couple (corrupter, corrupted) | Strongly disagree | | Disagree | | No opinion | | Agree | | Strongly Agree | | Total | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency |
| (Parent, Principal) | 100 | 29.4 | 10 | 2.9 | 30 | 8.8 | 40 | 11.8 | 160 | 47.1 | 340 | 100 |
| (Parent, teacher - principal of school) | 100 | 28.6 | 10 | 2.9 | 50 | 14.3 | 80 | 22.2 | 110 | 31.4 | 350 | 100 |
| (Parent, teacher) | 80 | 23.5 | 40 | 11.8 | 60 | 17.6 | 30 | 8.8 | 130 | 38.2 | 340 | 100 |

Source: *Our survey*

The results in table 1 show that on average one third (33%) of persons (corrupt. Corrupted) do not agree that corruption is practiced during

admission into government secondary schools (GSS). On the contrary, on average more than half (53.17%) persons (corrupt. Corrupted) agree that there are corruption practices during admission into government secondary schools. However, this table does not provide any information on the victims of adverse selection and moral hazard resulting from corruption during admission into government secondary schools.

Table 2. *Bribery at the entrance*

| Couple (corrupter, corrupted) | Z of Kolmogorov-Smirnov | P Value in % | Significant level in % | Decision | Victims of adverse – selection | Victims of moral hazard |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| (Parent, principal of school) | 1.647 | 0.9 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Parents | Ministry of national education |
| (Parent, teacher principal of school) | 1.291 | 7.1 | 5 | H ₀ (There is no bribery) | / | / |
| (Parent, teacher) | 1.385 | 4.3 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Parents | Principal of school, Ministry of National education |

Source: Our survey

Table 2 reveals three couples of bribery at the entrance.

The couple (parent, principal of school)

If we choose a 5% significant level, the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov applied on the opinions that parents give "gombo" to the principal of schools in order to guarantee the access of their children to higher classes is statistically significant. In fact, the P. value which is 0.9 is less than 5%, (H₁). The distribution of parent's opinions are not equal from one level of Likert's scale to another. The amounts of "gombo" given to the principal of schools van from 25,000 to 200,000) CFA. F².in one hand, the parents are victims of adverse selection since the conditions for succeeding in a competitive exam are unknow. In other hand, the Ministry of National Education is victim of moral hazard since the principal of school fails to respect his commitment towards government.

The couple (parent, teacher-principal of school)

The application of the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov on Likert on the subject of parents who offer "gombo" to teachers and principals of school to facilitate the registration of their children in school gives a P. value of 7.1% which is more than the 5% significant level that we selected. Consequently, we retain the null hypothesis. It signifies that the distribution of the opinions of parents between the last five levels of Likert is equal. Therefore the distribution observed is not statistically significant. Then, there is no bribery because flic principal of school doesn't want to share the "gombo" with the teacher (who is his direct collaborator). Another reason of rejecting the null hypothesis is that the principal of school wants to be seen as an

² By the time we were writing this paper, on dollar = 650 CFA. F

honest person. He doesn't want to show to his direct collaborator that he is corrupted.

The couple (parent, teacher)

To make a survey on whether they were parents who corrupt teacher to assure the success of their children in the competitive entrance GSS, we equally applied the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov. If we chose a 5% significant level, we can say that the idea of equal repartition of opinions is rejected because that level is more than the P. value which is 4.3%. We therefore conclude that the distribution of observed opinions is statistically significant (H₁).

The amount of "gombo" which accompanies the transactions between the teacher and the parent vary from 25,000 - 200,000 CFA.F. As in the case of bribery between students and teachers, the principal of school and the Ministry of National Education are victims of moral hazard because the teachers do not more respect their contracted engagement. The parents are victims of adverse selection as far as the conditions for succeeding in a competitive exam are not known. Moreover, the credibility of the school, the Ministry and even the entire education system are in a stage where testing of students to select the best is falsified.

5.2. Bribery at the outlet

As in the case of bribery at the entrance, we also have two tables concerning bribery at the outlet. The first (table 3) indicates different levels of bribery in absolute and relative values. The second (table 4) refers to the summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics from the first (table 3).

Table 3. Different levels of bribery according to Likert' scale

| Couple (corrupter, corrupted) | Strongly disagree | | Disagree | | No opinion | | Agree | | Strongly Agree | | Total | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency | Frequency | In % frequency |
| Couple (student, secretary) | 2800 | 48.3 | 200 | 3.4 | 1100 | 19 | 700 | 12.1 | 1000 | 17.1 | 5800 | 100 |
| Couple (student, teacher) ¹ | 2000 | 37 | 500 | 9.3 | 700 | 13.0 | 300 | 5.6 | 1900 | 35.2 | 5800 | 100 |
| Couple (student, teacher) ² | 2500 | 43.1 | 300 | 5.2 | 1000 | 17.2 | 700 | 12.1 | 1300 | 22.4 | 5800 | 100 |
| Couple (parent, principal of school) | 160 | 47.1 | 20 | 5.9 | 60 | 17.6 | 10 | 2.9 | 90 | 26.5 | 340 | 100 |
| Couple (parent, teacher) | 150 | 44.1 | 10 | 2.9 | 9 | 26.5 | 20 | 5.9 | 70 | 20.6 | 340 | 100 |

Source: Our survey

Table 3 reveals that on average almost half (49.26%) of couples interviewed do not admit that corruption is practiced at graduation in Government Secondary Schools (GSS) whereas on average almost one third

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(32.08%) of the couples interviewed are of the opinion that bribe is common at graduation in GSS. However, this table does not put into evidence the victims of moral hazard and adverse selection resulting from corruption practices during graduation in government schools.

Table 4. *Bribery at the outlet*

| Couple (corruptu, corrupted) | Z of Kolmogorov-Smirnov | P Value in % | Significant level in % | Decision | Victims of adverse – selection | Victims of hazard moral |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| (Student, Secretary) | 2.316 | 0.0 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Parents, students, principal of school | Principal of school |
| (Student, teacher) ³ | 1.718 | 0.5 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Parents, students | Principal of school, Ministry of national education |
| (Student, teacher) ⁴ | 2.081 | 0.0 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Students | Principal of school, Ministry of National education |
| (Parent, Principal of school) | 1.689 | 0.7 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Parents, students | Ministry of National education |
| (Parent, teacher) | 1.611 | 1.1 | 5 | H ₁ (There is bribery) | Principal of school, Ministry of National education | Principal of school, Ministry of National education |

Source: Our survey

Table 4 reveals four couples of bribery at the outlet.

The couple (student, secretary)

The test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov applied on the opinions of students who buy examination questions from secretaries of the examination secretariat gives a P. value equals to 0.00%. If we chose a 5% significant level which is more than the P. value, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the existence of bribery between de students and secretaries is statistically significant (H₁). The amount of the "gombo" varies from 3,000 to 15,000 CFA.F per exam question.

Between the secretaries (agent) and the principal of school, it exist a tacit contract whereby the secretary has to preserve the confidentiality of the examination questions. As from the moment where the secretary gives exam questions to students before the examination date, in exchange of "gombo" it is considered that the secretary has violated the tacit contract hence causing a moral hazard to the principal of school. This principal at the same time is victim of the adverse-selection because he ignores that there are some students who never merited a success.

³ In the case of practical exam

⁴ In the case of obtaining exams questions before examination

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Moreover, the student and the parent are victims of adverse-selection. The student ignores that the purchase of examination question is of very bad quality. When the parent registers his child in a school where bribery is practiced, to him, his child's success is already guaranteed since the success will be based on "gombo". The "gombo" which is given to the secretary can either be from the parent or from the student himself. In the first situation, bribery can be qualified as a family issue in the case where the bribery act is from the agreement between two members of the same family. In the second case, the student carries a corruptive transaction without the knowledge of the father. This can be qualified as solitary bribery. Whatever be the case, the success of the student is not merited and the student is not also well trained.

The advantages of student who is a corrupter is the economy of working time (he can engage in extra school activities or leisure) and energy (he does not furnish any intellectual effort). At the level of losses, the student obtains the certificate but not longer furnishes any knowledge. Moreover, the student engages in irrational financial expenses by giving "gombo" to secretaries which will never permit to improve his performance.

The couple (student, teacher)

The survey reveals that the corruption between student and teachers is realized in two cases. The first one takes place during practical exams and the second one takes place before the exam date in order to obtain examination questions.

The opinions sampled on the cases of students corrupting teachers during practical exams (end of course exams) was realized by the application of the analysis on the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov. If we chose a 5% significant level, we can say that the null hypothesis which reflects the equal allocation opinions will be rejected because the P. value calculated which is 0.5% is less than the significant level (H1). We therefore conclude that the opinions are statistically significant. The amounts of this "gombo" vary from 3,000 to 20,000 CFA.F. Moreover, 46.3% students disagree that the service given to them by teachers are of bad quality. They don't know that positive results without merit will be sanctioned in the labor market. Parents are also victims of adverse-selection whether they are accomplices or not. In the case that they are accomplices, the effect of adverse-selection is justified by the fact that the diploma or certificate obtained will be of no value in the labor market. In the other cases, the parents are victims of adverse-selection because they ignore that the diplomas offered to their children are falsified.

The application of the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov on the subject of "gombo" given to teacher by students so on to obtain examination questions before the exams date reveals that a 5% significant level is more than the P. value equal to 0%. We reject the null hypothesis. The amounts of "gombo" vary from 3,000 to 15,000 CFA.F.

At this level, students are victims of adverse-selection but ignore the fact that the services given to them by the teachers are of bad quality. The

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principal of school and his Minister suffer from moral hazard due to the non-respect of the engagement contract by the teachers.

The couple (parent, principal of school)

The opinions sampled on the subject of parents giving money to the principal of schools so that their children should be promoted in higher classes without having the required average is statistically significant. In fact, if we choose a 5% significant level which is more than the P. value (0.7%), we reject the null hypothesis. The amounts of "gombo" vary from 25,000 to 150,000 CFA, F.

It appears that the parents and their children are victims of adverse-selection because they ignore that the services given to them by the principal of school are of bad quality since the principal of school abuses the confidence placed on him by his Ministry.

The couple (parent, teacher)

At 5% significant level, the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov applied on the opinions that parents give "gombo" to teachers to permit their children to pass to higher classes without having the required average 15 statistically significant because the P. value which is 1.1% is less than 5% (H₀). The amounts of the "gombo" vary from 25,000 to 100,000 CFA.F. The principal of school and the Ministry are victims of adverse-selection, because they have been abused by the teacher. Moreover parents and their children are also victims of adverse-selection because they ignore the fact that the services given to them are of bad quality.

6. Conclusion

Finally, this paper shows that corruption practices observed in GSS generate adverse-selection and moral hazard. Considering the case of bribery at the outlet, students are victims of adverse-selection since they ignore that the services given to them by teachers are of bad quality. At this level, the Ministry of National Education is a victim of moral hazard as well as a parent who is also victimized when his brilliant child fails an examination because "gombo" was not offered to the principal of school. Moreover, bribery at the entrance and at the outlet equally increases the charges of the education users. In fact, admitting a student in the GSS through "gombo" requires an amount varying between 25,000 to 200,000 CFA.F. As concerns admission in a higher class certain parents offer to teachers amount varying between 25,000 to 100.000 CFA. F. This additional expenditure gives advantages to dull students and disadvantages to clever student who have not got the means to offer the "gombo" because it would have been used for other things. Worst of all, the users do not obtain the required training since their problem is to obtain the diploma and not the knowledge. In the second case, the wasted amount is equally analyzed as in the preceding case. The practice of bribery observed in GSS in Cameroon really discredit the educational system in Cameroon hence hindering the development of the country.

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The question asked is to know “what needs to be done to put and end to this phenomenal?” Or at least “how to greatly reduce it?”. The next article will permit us to have an answer to this question.

Appendixes

Appendix 1. Summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics from Table 1

| (Corrupter, corrupted) | Z of Kolmogorov-Smirnov | P. value in % | Decision |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| (Parent, principal of school) | 1.647 | 0.9 | H ₁ (There is bribery) |
| (Parent, teacher-principal of school) | 1.291 | 7.1 | H ₀ (There is no bribery) |
| (Parent, teacher) | 1.385 | 4.3 | H ₁ (There is bribery) |

Source: Our survey

Appendix 2. Summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics from Table 3

| Couple (corrupter, corrupted) | Z of Kolmogorov-Smirnov | P. value in % | Decision |
|--|-------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| (Student, secretary) | 2.316 | 0.0 | H ₁ (There is bribery) |
| (Student, teacher) in the case of practical exam | 1.718 | 0.5 | H ₁ |
| (student, teacher) in the case of obtaining exams questions before examination | 2.081 | 0.0 | H ₁ |
| (Parent, principal of school) | 1.689 | 0.7 | H ₁ |
| (Parent, teacher) | 1.611 | 1.1 | H ₁ |

Source: Our survey

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