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A study on incentives and behaviors of each age group in transition countries: Case for Mongolia

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Abstract. This section is examined statistically whether the importance of the motives for act and the acceptances for lower wage and labor incentives is different between each age group. Above results shows young age group is "self-actualization" as important motive, old age group is "moral" as it. And old age group has higher labor incentives when it is suggested higher wage than the wage according to my ability, and when it is the lifetime employment system. Older age group think "moral" as important motive. They think that want to rewarded with the lifetime employment system and higher wage. It checked that action motives differed according to a generation.Moreover, Prospect Theory, the efficiency wage hypothesis, and the relative wage hypothesis were satisfied, and it was checked that the influences differ in his twenties as compared with other generations. Moreover, the rate of desiring lifelong employment system as a senior was large, and his twenties had many people who do not desire lifelong employment system strongly. This shows that consciousness change and a behavioral change may have arisen in that time in 1990 which shifted to the market economy bordering on people who were his teens, i.e., his present twenties, and his 30's. It is shown that there is no big difference the results of transition country, the results of advanced nations, especially the result of Japan.
Keywords. The efficiency wage hypothesis; The relative wage hypothesis; Lifelong employment system; Mongolia
JEL. P20; P22; P25.

1. Introduction

This paper examine whether market economy make differences in the consciousness of each generation in transition countries. Mongolia has moved from the socialist economy to market economy in 1990 twenty years ago. Market economy led to major changes in lifestyle. The effort is also likely to increase income. This paper consider whether such environments change make differences in labor awareness and consumer behaviors of each generation by using behavioral economics methods. I specially verify whether the changes of awareness has occurred bordering on teens when it has changed from a socialist economy to market economy in 1990. That is now 30's. Purpose is to examine whether market economy make differences in the awareness of each generation. This research verifies whether general economic is satisfied in transition countries, and whether the results of transition countries difference with that of development

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countries, especially in Japan. I consider three views based on survey of behavioral economics. Based on the above-mentioned viewpoint, this research clarifies the volition as workers, and the motive of action by considering the result of investigation of the behavioral economics in shift country

Mongolian. Furthermore, this research considers the difference in between the generations to the gap of wages and the consciousness to labor. In the following, it consider about the difference in awareness and behaviors of each generation in transition countries by examining above views. In Section II, it consider about labor motive. In Section III, it conclusion.

2. Labormotives

This section focuses on three points. Firstly, Do people take action on based on what motivated? Standard economics focus on only economic incentives. But, Section 2.2 verify that how much do people focus on economic incentives than other various incentives. Secondary, Section 2.3 focuses on incentives as a worker. It verify whether people accept the low wage under various situations if people are salaried worker. By above, It examine about relative wage hypothesis and efficiency wage hypothesis, whether the lifetime employment system increases labor incentives. Thirdly, Section 2.4 verifies that what incentives of each generation relation to low wage acceptance and labor incentives.

2.1. Data

I surveyed to 430 people in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Table 1-Table3 show about sexes, ages, household income. Sex ratio is about half. The number of sample of age composition is 50 or more in each age group of every 10 years old. Household annual income is distributed widely.

Its survey was questioned about five incentives as incentives that people bahavioir. This is “you gain economically by do a behavior”, you are evaluated socially by do a behavior”, “doing a behavior is useful for self-actualization”, “doing a behavior is morally right”, “doing a behavior is pleasant”. Answers are five steps. It is “very important”, “Important”, “nether”, “not important”, “not important at all”. Higher value for the motives means the low importance more for motives. I imaginary questioned.

I assume that respondent is salaried worker, and I did four question about labor motive.

1. If you think that your wage is according to your ability when deflation occurs, can you accept the lower your wage than ever before?

2. If you think that your wage is according to your ability when deflation occures, can you accept the lower your wage than colleague’s wage?

3. If you think that your wage is higher than the wage according to your ability, Do you rise your motive to your work?

4. If you can work with one company forever, Do you rise your motive to your work than ever before?

Answers to two questions about the decline in wages are following four steps. “Accept” ”Accept unwillingly” “None too accept” “Not accept”. Answers to two questions about the motives to works are following five steps. “Very rise” “Rise” “Not change” “Rather weaken” “Weaken”. I questioned about the identity and attributes as other questions.

Table 1. *The frequency table for every sex*

	Frequency	Percent
Man	210	49
Women	220	51
Total	430	100

Table 2. *The frequency table for every age*

Age	Frequency	Percent
20-29	107	24.88
30-39	92	21.40
40-49	95	22.09
50-59	85	19.77
60-69	35	8.14
70-	16	3.72
Total	430	100

Table 3. *Household Income (unit: thousands togrig)*

	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
～15	75	17.25	17.25
15～18	34	7.93	25.17
18～21	26	6.06	31.24
21～24	25	5.83	37.06
24～27	26	6.06	43.12
27～30	21	4.9	48.02
30～33	18	4.2	52.21
33～36	20	4.66	56.88
36～39	20	4.66	61.54
39～42	23	5.36	66.9
42～45	26	6.06	72.96
45～48	29	6.76	79.72
48～51	7	1.63	81.35
51～54	6	1.4	82.75
54～57	8	1.86	84.62
57～60	6	1.4	86.01
60～63	8	1.86	87.88
63～66	4	0.93	88.81
66～69	2	0.47	89.28
69～72	14	3.26	92.54
72～	32	7.45	100
Total	430	100	

2.2. Incentives for behaviors

Five motives are assumed as a motive when people act. Firstly, it investigates the importance of eachmotive. This is “you gain economically by do a action(=economic motives)”, ”you are evaluated sociallyby do a behavior(=social evaluation)”, “doing a behavior is useful forself-

actualization(=self-actualization)", "doing a behavior is morally right(=moral rightness)", "doing a behavior is pleasant(=pleasure)".

Table 4 - Table 9 shows descriptive statistics and frequency distribution. The importance of five motives is high in order of "economic motives", "social evaluation", "self-actualization", "moral", "pleasure" from average value. The importance of "economic motives" is the highest. Tukamoto (2010) shows that the importance for motives when people acts is high in order of "moral", "pleasure" in Japan.

Table 4. *Descriptive statistics about the importance of motivation*

	Economic motivew	Social evaluation	Self-actualization	Moral righrness	Pleasure
Freauency	430	430	430	430	430
Average	1.33	1.77	1.82	1.85	2.33
Median	1	2	2	2	2
Mode	1	2	2	2	2
Std.Dev.	0.55	0.81	0.84	0.90	1.05

Table 5. *The frequency table of "gaining economically"*

Economic motives	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
1. Very important	304	70.7	70.7
2. Important	112	26.05	96.74
3. Neither	12	2.79	99.53
4. Not important	2	0.47	100
5. Not important at all	0	0	100
Total	430	100	

Table 6. *The frequency table of "evaluating socially"*

Social motives	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
1. Very important	174	40.47	40.47
2. Important	204	47.44	87.91
3. Neither	30	6.98	94.88
4. Not important	20	4.65	99.53
5. Not important at all	2	0.47	100
Total	430	100	

Table 7. *The frequency table of "contributing to self-actualization"*

Self-actualization	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
1. Very important	158	36.74	36.74
2. Important	220	51.16	87.91
3. Neither	30	6.98	94.88
4. Not important	14	3.26	98.14
5. Not important at all	8	1.86	100
Total	430	100	

Table 8. *A "morally right" frequency table*

Moral rightness	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
1. Very important	158	36.74	36.74
2. Important	222	51.63	88.37
3. Neither	16	3.72	92.09
4. Not important	24	5.58	97.67
5. Not important at all	10	2.33	100
Total	430	100	

Table 9. *A"pleasant" frequency table*

Pleasure	Frequency	Percent	Accumulation (%)
1. Very important	82	19.07	19.07
2. Important	218	50.7	69.77
3. Neither	52	12.09	81.86
4. Not important	64	14.88	96.74
5. Not important at all	12	3.26	100
Total	430	100	

2.3. Acceptance for low wage and labor incentives

This verify whether people accept the low wage under various situations if people are salaried worker. And, it examine about prospect theory, relative wage hypothesis and efficiency wage hypothesis, the lifetime employment system by using frequency distribution.

Table 10 – Table 12 show the descriptive statistics and frequency distribution of about the acceptance for the low wage. Corresponding questions are two of 1 and 2.

1. If you think that your wage is according to your ability when deflation occures, can you accept the lower wage than before?

2. If you think that your wage is according to your ability when deflation occurs, can you accept the lower your wage than colleague's wage?

Answers about two questions are four steps. Higher value means that not accepting the wages more. There are many replies of "Accept unwillingly" and "None too accept" about both questions. There is many replies of "Accept unwillingly" of two. It is the same as the result of Japan. Standard economics indicates that people are not influenced by the surrounding situation such as deflation and colleague's wage if people match my ability. But the result is different with standard economics. The ratio of "Accept" is less than 20%. The prospect theory by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) suggests that people has a referring points as the standard of estimation, and it evaluates that the loss from a referring point is more greatly than the profit from it. If people's referring point is the present nominal wage, the prospect theory from frequency distribution is right. Because The results of Table 11 can explain that people are reluctant acceptance to recognize as the loss the lower wages than before when deflation occurs.

If people's referring point is the relative wage to colleague, the relative wage hypothesis from frequency distribution is right. Because it can explain that people are reluctant acceptance to recognize as the loss the lower wages than colleague. It can think that the relative wage hypothesis is a part of the prospect theory. The relative wage hypothesis is indicated that workers think as important not only my wage but also the other's wage. The results of Table 12 shows that it is also important colleague's wage for my wage's acceptance. Next, It reports the results about labor incentives. The questions about labor incentives is following two. Higher value means the low importance more for motives.

3. If you think that your wage is higher than the wage according to your ability, Do you rise your motive to your work?

4. If you can work with one company forever, Do you rise your motive to your work than ever before?

Table 13 – Table 15 show the deskriptive and frequency distribution. The wage beyond capability means the increase in wages exceeding the increase in products that the additional labor supply make. Higher incentive has the possibility which make higher productivity. Standard economics is not important about labor incentive. The efficiency wage hypothesis by Akerlof & Yallen (1986) suggests that workers has higher incentives and productivity if workers accept the higher wage than the wage according to theirself that workers think theirself. Table 14 shows that workers of about 90% has higher incentives if workers accept the higher wage than the wage according to theirself that workers think theirself. Galbraith & Darity (1994) shows the connotation which efficiency wage hypothesis and relative wage hypothesis give to macroeconomy. So the efficiency wage hypothesis is right. Above result about the prospect theory, the relative wage hypothesis, the efficiency wage hypothesis is right in transition country, in Mongolia. It is the same as the result of Japan. The effect that the lifetime employment system influences to labor incentives is the effect that the system raises the incentives and decreases the incentives to cause the moral hazard by the disappearance of the risk of dismissal. Table 15 shows that 29.3% is not change for labor incentives. About 60% raises the incentives. The lifetime employment system has positive effect for labor incentives. Mongolia's result is the same as the result of Japan.

Table 10. *Descriptive statistics about acceptance of low wages*

	Acceptance of the wages fall at deflation	Acceptance of wages lower than a coworker
Frequency	430	430
Average	2.40	2.12
Median	2	2
Mode	2	1
Std.Dev.	0.97	1.08

Table 11. *The frequency table about acceptance of the wages fall at the time of deflation (Prospect Theory)*

	Frequency	Percent	Accumaliton (%)
1. Accept	80	18.6	18.6
2. Accept unwillingly	164	38.14	56.74
3. None too accept	118	27.44	84.19
4. Not accept	68	15.81	100
Total	430	100	

Table 12. *The frequency table about acceptance of wages lower than a coworker (relative wage hypothesis)*

	Frequency	Percent	Accumaliton (%)
1. Accept	80	18.6	18.6
2. Accept unwillingly	164	38.14	56.74
3. None too accept	118	27.44	84.19
4. Not accept	68	15.81	100
Total	430	100	

Table 13. *Descriptive statistics about work incentives*

	Work incentive when having obtained the wages beyond capability	Work incentive when working in one company throughout life
Frequency	430	430
Average	1.68	2.32
Median	2	2
Mode	2	2
Std.Dev.	0.76	1.14

Table 14. *The frequency table of work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability*

	Frequency	Percent	Accumaliton (%)
1. Very rise	194	45.12	45.12
2. Rise	194	45.12	90.23
3. Not change	34	7.91	98.14
4. Rather weaken	2	0.47	98.6
5. Weaken	6	1.4	100
Total	430	100	

Table 15. *The frequency table of work incentives when working in one company throughout life (lifelong employment system)*

	Frequency	Percent	Accumaliton (%)
1. Very rise	114	26.51	26.51
2. Rise	146	33.95	60.47
3. Not change	126	29.3	89.77
4. Rather weaken	8	1.86	91.63
5. Weaken	36	8.37	100
Total	430	100	

2.4. Incentives for act and labor incentive andAcceptance for low wage

This investigates from correlation about the coefficient relation with five motives and acceptance for low wage and labor incentive. Answers about motives is five steps. Answers about the acceptance for the low wages is four steps. Answers about labor incentives is five steps.

It is calculated Pearson correlation coefficient and Kendall's rank correlation coefficient to confirm whether their values is interval scales or ordinal scales. Kendall's rank correlation coefficient has merits which is not assumed normality and homoscedasticity. Steps for answers are two type of four steps and Table 16 – Table 19 show the results about correlation coefficient. Table16 shows the results for the questions about the acceptances for the lower wages than before when deflation occurs. Both the results of pearson's and kendall's about the questions is significant at 5% levels is "moral" and "pleasure". So the respondent which is important "moral" accepts lower wages than before when deflation occures. All sign is negative in Japan. so the results inMongolia is contrary to the result in Japan.

Table 16. *Correlation with the importance of each motivation, and the degree of acceptance of the wages fall at the time of deflation*

Acceptance of the wages fall at deflation		Pearson correlation coefficient	Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau b)
		0.098*	0.083
Economic motives	P value	0.041	0.059
	Sample	430	430
		0.071	0.043
Social evalution	P value	0.143	0.313
	Sample	430	430
		0.100*	0.075
Self-actualization	P value	0.038	0.076
	Sample	430	430
		0.219*	0.184**
Moral rightness	P value	0	0
	Sample	430	430
		0.206*	0.188**
Pleasure	P value	0	0
	Sample	430	430

Table 17 shows the results for the questions about the acceptances for the lower wages than colleague's wage. Both the two results about the questions is significant at 5% levels is "economic motives" and "moral" "pleasure". Sign is positive. People who think these motives as important have the strong concern about myself, and seldom care about the others. So it think they accept the lower wage than colleague's wage.

Table 17. *Correlation with the importance of each motivation, and acceptance of wages lower than a Coworker*

Acceptance of wages lower than a coworker		Pearson correlation coefficient	Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau b)
		0.121*	0.13**
Economic motives	P value	0.012	0.003
	Sample	430	430
		-0.043	-0.039
Social evalution	P value	0.371	0.355
	Sample	430	430
		0.08	0.051
Self-actualization	P value	0.096	0.229
	Sample	430	430
		0.196**	0.201**
Moral rightness	P value	0	0
	Sample	430	430
		0.130**	0.112**
Pleasure	P value	0.007	0.007
	Sample	430	430

Table 18 shows the results for the questions about labor incentive when it is suggested for higher wage than according to your ability. Both the two results about the questions is positive and significant at 5% levels is "economic motives" and "social evaluation". People who think these motives as important means that has higher motives than before when it is suggested for higher wages than according to your ability. People who think

these motives as important want to earn and evaluate to the others than before.

Table18. *Correlation with the importance of each motivation, and the degree of work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability*

Work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability		Pearson correlation coefficient	Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau b)
		0.12*	0.134**
Economic motives	P value	0.013	0.004
	Sample	430	430
		0.124**	0.145**
Social evalution	P value	0.01	0.001
	Sample	430	430
		0.087	0.102*
Self-actualization	P value	0.073	0.022
	Sample	430	430
		0.066	0.094*
Moral rightness	P value	0.17	0.035
	Sample	430	430
		0.05	0.09*
Pleasure	P value	0.303	0.037
	Sample	430	430

Table 19 shows the results for the questions about labor incentives for when the lifetime employment system. Both the two results about the questions is positive and significant at 5% levels is "economic motives" and "self-actualization". I think people who think self-actualization motives as important think that would like to try hard in order to achieve my aim. Self-actualization and social estimation has affected labor incentives in addition to the economic motives when the lifetime employment system and when higher wage than the wage according to my ability. It can think that higher labor incentives improve labor productivity. It also thinks other motives in addition to economics motives as important. Its results is not introduced from standard economics.

The motives which influence to the acceptance for the lower wage is different to the motives which influence to the labor incentives.

Table 19. *Correlation with the importance of each motivation, and the degree of work incentives when working in one company throughout life*

Work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability		Pearson correlation coefficient	Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau b)
		0.101*	0.147**
Economic motives	P value	0.037	0.001
	Sample	430	430
		0.069	0.031
Social evalution	P value	0.155	0.458
	Sample	430	430
		0.166**	0.134**
Self-actualization	P value	0.001	0.002
	Sample	430	430

		0.06	0.088*
Moral rightness	P value	0.217	0.038
	Sample	430	430
		0.09	0.041
Pleasure	P value	0.063	0.317
	Sample	430	430

2.5. Age and incentives for act and labor incentive and acceptance for low wage

This section focuses on the age. It examines statistically about the relationship the age and the motives for act, the age and the acceptances for the lower wage and labor incentives. It uses for each age group 10 years as age variances.

2.5.1. Age and Incentives for act

Firstly, it examines about the relationship the age and the motives for act. It investigates whether the importance of five motives is different between each age group. This use Kruskal-Wallis test which is not assumed the normality and homoscedasticity. The result is showed in Table 20."social evaluation" is different to and significant at 5% levels between each age group. Next, it examines whether there is the difference between two age group using Mann-Whitney test. Number of age group is six. Each combination of the two is fifteen. When it sets to the 5% significance levels, it is 0.0033 by using the correction to the Bonferroni's inequality, it is that 15 divided by 0.05. Table 21 shows that the importancebof "social evaluation" for 20's age group is different to the importance of "social evaluation" for 30's age group. 20's age group thinks as important "social evaluation" than 30's age group. That is, I think that the younger age group wants to be evaluated by the others.

Table 20. *Kruskal-Wallis test about the importance of the motivation for every age group*

	Economic motives	Social evaluation	Self-ectualization	Moral rightness	Pleasure
Chi Square	9.047	10.786*	7.33	2.253	7.488
Degree of freedom	5	5	5	5	5
P value	0.107	0.048	0.197	0.813	0.187

Table 21. *The frequency table of "evaluating socially" for every age group*

	Frequency	Average	Std.Dev.
20's	132	1.67	0.748
30's	102	1.87	0.718
40's	120	1.77	0.923
50's	60	1.87	0.769
60's-	16	1.75	1.01
Total	430	1.77	0.807

Table 22. *Mann-Whitney test of "evaluating socially" for every age group*

Mann-Whitney	Social evaluation			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	5630	14408	-2.355	0.019*
20's and 40's	7690	16468	-0.439	0.661
20's and 50's	3356	12134	-1.872	0.061
20's and 60's-	1048	1184	-0.055	0.957
30's and 40's	5316	12576	-1.848	0.065
30's and 50's	3002	4832	-0.225	0.822
30's and 60's-	684	820	-1.14	0.254
40's and 50's	3162	10422	-1.469	0.142
40's and 60's-	924	1060	-0.267	0.789
50's and 60's-	404	540	-1.089	0.276

2.5.2. Age andAcceptance for low wage

Secondary, it examines about the relationship the age and the acceptances about lower wage. Although it was checked that Prospect Theory is satisfied from Section 2.3, it is verified whether the impact of Prospect Theory differs for every generation here. It investigates whether the acceptances about lower wage is different between each age group. Table 23 shows the result. it is not different between each age group. It is not confirmed the results that two tests is both significant. A result shows that Prospect Theory which presupposes that a wages fall is realized as a bigger loss is satisfied. Moreover, it was checked that the acceptance to a wages fall differs for every generation.

The results of Mann-Whitney test are Table 25 and Table 27. Although the acceptance of the wages fall at the time of deflation was not able to check the significant difference between generations, it was checked that the low wages acceptance in comparison with a coworker has a difference among generations. The difference was found out between his twenties and his 30's, between his twenties and his 50's, between his 40's and his 50's, and between his 50's and his 60's.

Table 23. *Kruskal-Wallis test about acceptance of the low wages for every age group*

	Acceptance of the wages fall at deflation	Acceptance of wages lower than a coworker	Work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability	Work incentives when working in one company throughout life
Chi square	14.408*	20.324**	16.199**	48.753**
Degree of freedom	5	5	5	5
P value	0.013	0.001	0.006	0

Table 24. *The frequency table of "acceptance of the wages fall at the time of deflation" for every age group*

	Frequency	Average	Std.Dev.
20's	132	2.45	0.911
30's	102	2.35	0.886
40's	120	2.32	1.012
50's	60	2.5	1.033
60's-	16	2.63	1.258
Total	430	2.4	0.965

Table 25. *Mann-Whitney test of "acceptance of the wages fall at the time of deflation" for every age group*

Mann-Whitney	Acceptance of the wages fall at deflation			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	6338	11591	-0.809	0.419
20's and 40's	7146	14406	-1.406	0.16
20's and 50's	3858	12636	-0.299	0.765
20's and 60's-	970	9748	-0.556	0.578
30's and 40's	5844	13104	-0.609	0.543
30's and 50's	2834	8067	-0.893	0.732
30's and 60's-	712	5965	-0.857	0.392
40's and 50's	3216	10476	-1.218	0.223
40's and 60's-	830	8090	-0.972	0.356
50's and 60's-	430	2280	-0.394	0.693

Table 26. *The frequency table of "acceptance of wages lower than a coworker" for every age group*

	Frequency	Average	Std.Dev.
20's	132	2.32	1.021
30's	102	2.00	1.053
40's	120	2.13	1.107
50's	60	1.77	0.998
60's-	16	2.50	1.366
Total	430	2.12	1.077

Table 27. *Mann-Whitney test of "acceptance of wages lower than a coworker" for every age group*

Mann-Whitney	Acceptance of the wages fall at deflation			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	5542	10795	-2.42	0.016*
20's and 40's	7098	14358	-1.483	0.138
20's and 50's	2776	4606	-3.484	0**
20's and 60's-	965	9742	-0.592	0.554
30's and 40's	5734	10987	-0.851	0.394
30's and 50's	2662	4492	-1.481	0.131
30's and 60's-	650	5903	-1.375	0.169
40's and 50's	2926	4756	-2.104	0.03*
40's and 60's-	812	8072	-1.046	0.295
50's and 60's-	332	2162	-2.055	0.040*

2.5.3. The difference in the work incentives for every generation

Thirdly, it examines about the relationship the age and labor incentives. It was checked that the efficiency wage hypothesis and the relative wage hypothesis are satisfied in Section 2.3. Here, it is verified whether the influences of the hypothesis differ for every generation. It investigates whether labor incentives is different between each age group. Table 28 shows the result. Table 28 shows that old age group has higher labor incentives than young age group at average value when it is suggested higher wage than the wage according to my ability. Table 29 shows the result of Mann-Whitney test to examine about labor incentives between each age group. It is different between 20's and 40's, 40's and 50's. It is confirmed the results that two tests is both significant. That is, work incentives are not concerned with wages,

and are not constant, and the influence which wages have on work incentives is the greatest his twenties.

Table 28. *The frequency table of "the work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability" for every age group*

	Frequency	Average	Std.Dev.
20's	132	1.59	0.761
30's	102	1.67	0.674
40's	120	1.83	0.737
50's	60	1.57	0.890
60's-	16	1.63	0.719
Total	430	1.68	0.757

Table 29. *Mann-Whitney test of "the work incentives when having obtained the wages beyond capability" for every age group*

Mann-Whitney	Work incentives when having ontained the wages beyond capability			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	6040	14818	-1.5	0.134
20's and 40's	6246	15024	-3.226	0.001**
20's and 50's	3718	5548	-0.766	0.444
20's and 60's-	1012	9790	-0.305	0.760
30's and 40's	5492	10745	-1.460	0.144
30's and 50's	2586	4416	-1.819	0.069
30's and 60's-	770	906	-0.398	0.691
40's and 50's	2616	4436	-3.128	0.002**
40's and 60's-	808	944	-1.148	0.251
50's and 60's-	434	2264	-0.666	0.505

2.5.4. The difference in the consciousness to the lifelong employment system for every generation

Fourth, it examines about the relationship the age and labor incentives for the lifetime employment system. Although it was checked that lifelong employment system is desired in Section 2.3, it is verified whether the expected values to lifelong employment system differ for every generation here. It investigates whether labor incentives for the lifetime employment system is different between each age group. Table 30 shows the result. Table 30 shows that old age group has higher labor incentives than young age group at average value when it is the lifetime employment system. Table 31 shows the result of Mann-Whitney test to examine about labor incentives between each age group. It is different between 20's and 30's, 20's and 40's, 20's and 50's, 30's and 50's, 40's and 50's, 50's and 60's. 20's is different to all age group. Labor incentives increase significantly if people can work life at one company. That is, his twenties and his 50's differ from other generation to expectation value to lifetime employment system. When his twenties becomes lifelong employment system, there are more people who think that work incentives decline than other generations.

Table 30. *The frequency table of "the work incentives when working in one company throughout life" for every age group*

	Frequency	Average	Std.Dev.
20's	132	2.79	1.29
30's	102	2.33	1.102
40's	120	2.17	0.920
50's	60	1.57	0.722
60's-	16	2.25	1
Total	430	2.32	1.135

Table 31. *Mann-Whitney test of "the work incentives when working in one company throughout life" for every age group*

Mann-Whitney	Work incentives when working in one company throughout life			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	5484	10737	-2.528	0.011*
20's and 40's	5864	13124	-3.718	0**
20's and 50's	1734	3564	-6.489	0**
20's and 60's-	824	960	-1.485	0.138
30's and 40's	5686	12946	-0.959	0.337
30's and 50's	1806	3636	-4.585	0**
30's and 60's-	796	932	-0.165	0.869
40's and 50's	2258	4088	-4.316	0**
40's and 60's-	916	8176	-0.315	0.753
50's and 60's-	290	2120	-2.462	0.008**

3. Conclusion

This section is examined statistically whether the importance of the motives for act and the acceptances for lower wage and labor incentives is different between each age group. Above results shows young age group is "self-actualization" as important motive, old age group is "moral" as it. And old age group has higher labor incentives when it is suggested higher wage than the wage according to my ability, and when it is the lifetime employment system. Older age group think "moral" as important motive. They think that want to rewarded with the lifetime employment system and higher wage. It checked that action motives differed according to a generation. Moreover, Prospect Theory, the efficiency wage hypothesis, and the relative wage hypothesis were satisfied, and it was checked that the influences differ in his twenties as compared with other generations. Moreover, the rate of desiring lifelong employment system as a senior was large, and his twenties had many people who do not desire lifelong employment system strongly. This shows that consciousness change and a behavioral change may have arisen in that time in 1990 which shifted to the market economy bordering on people who were his teens, i.e., his present twenties, and his 30's. It is shown that there is no big difference the results of transition country, the results of advanced nations, especially the result of Japan.

Table. 32. *Economic motives*

Mann-Whitney	Economic motives			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	633	15108	-0.87	0.332
20's and 40's	7576	14836	-0.788	0.437
20's and 50's	3854	12632	-0.375	0.708
20's and 60's	600	655	-0.612	0.54
20's and 70's-	212	8990	-2.397	0.017*
30's and 40's	5496	12756	-1.659	0.097
30's and 50's	2970	4800	-0.38	0.704
30's and 60's	432	487	-0.97	0.332
30's and 70's-	174	5427	-2.106	0.035*
40's and 50's	3362	10622	-0.949	0.343
40's and 60's	574	629	-0.31	0.757
40's and 70's-	190	7450	-2.562	0.01**
50's and 60's	206	321	-0.732	0.47
50's and 70's-	104	1934	-2.042	0.041*
60's and 70's-	97	1869	-2.016	0.044*

Table 33. *Self-Actualization*

Mann-Whitney	Self-Actualization			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	5966	14744	-1.656	0.098
20's and 40's	7128	15906	-1.5	0.134
20's and 50's	3892	12670	-0.212	0.832
20's and 60's	440	9218	-1.905	0.057
20's and 70's-	386	9164	-0.115	0.909
30's and 40's	6072	13332	-0.113	0.91
30's and 50's	2728	4558	-1.334	0.182
30's and 60's	362	5615	-1.687	0.012
30's and 70's-	274	295	-0.497	0.691
40's and 50's	3280	5110	-1.083	0.274
40's and 60's	442	7702	-1.491	0.136
40's and 70's-	330	351	-0.378	0.705
50's and 60's	202	2032	-1.825	0.068
50's and 70's-	178	2008	-0.052	0.958
60's and 70's-	120	141	-1.125	0.261

Table 34. *Moral rightness*

Mann-Whitney	Moral rightness			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	6442	11695	-0.636	0.525
20's and 40's	7362	14622	-1.063	0.288
20's and 50's	3914	5744	-0.145	0.885
20's and 60's	560	9338	-0.881	0.378
20's and 70's-	364	385	-0.375	0.708
30's and 40's	5916	13176	-0.474	0.635
30's and 50's	2964	8217	-0.378	0.705
30's and 60's	422	5675	-1.004	0.315
30's and 70's-	296	317	-0.153	0.878
40's and 50's	3382	10642	-0.728	0.467
40's and 60's	504	7764	-0.911	0.367
40's and 70's-	356	7616	-0.050	0.960
50's and 60's	254	2084	-0.851	0.395
50's and 70's-	168	189	-0.305	0.761
60's and 70's-	24	45	-0.693	0.488

Table 35. *Pleasure*

Mann-Whitney	Pleasure			
	Mann-Whitney's U	Wilcoxon's W	Z	P value
20's and 30's	6052	14830	-1.407	0.16
20's and 40's	7712	14972	-0.387	0.698
20's and 50's	3686	12464	-0.821	0.412
20's and 60's	482	9260	-1.506	0.132
20's and 70's-	310	9088	-0.953	0.341
30's and 40's	5232	12492	-2.024	0.043*
30's and 50's	2908	4738	-0.572	0.567
30's and 60's	414	5667	-1.055	0.291
30's and 70's-	270	5523	-0.520	0.603
40's and 50's	3218	10487	-1.281	0.2
40's and 60's	410	7670	-1.836	0.066
40's and 70's-	266	7526	-1.192	0.233
50's and 60's	234	2064	-1.233	0.218
50's and 70's-	152	1982	-0.697	0.486
60's and 70's-	128	149	-0.258	0.796

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