Abstract
Abstract. In August 2020, FOMC chair Jerome Powell announced a strategy for achieving an inclusive value of the FOMC’s goal of maximum employment. The strategy rests on discovering the minimal value of sustainable unemployment by running the economy above potential until the unemployment rate declines to a level that initiates an inflation overshoot from the FOMC’s longer-run 2 percent target. There is presumably no contradiction with an FOMC target for inflation of 2 percent. As indicated by the appellation “flexible-average-inflation targeting” (FAIT), the inflation overshoot would compensate for prior undershoots of the 2 percent target. The FOMC’s current framework is reminiscent of the 1970s. With a country fractured over the Vietnam War and a militant civil rights movement, a socially desirable low unemployment rate became a political imperative. FOMC chairman Arthur Burns accepted the challenge (Hetzel 1998, 2008, Ch. 8). The Keynesian consensus of the time promised to deliver a socially desirable rate of unemployment at least as low as 4 percent at the cost of only moderate inflation. This desirable Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation became the centerpiece of monetary policy. Modigliani & Papademos (1975 and 1976) provided the organizing principle for monetary policy. Namely, there is a predictable and “exploitable” trade-off in which changes in inflation depend upon the difference between the unemployment rate and a full-employment rate termed the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). At least in 2021, however, the FOMC assumption is that there is no trade-off because the Phillips curve is assumed flat at least down to its prepandemic low of 3.5%. When persistent inflation above 2% emerges, the adjective “flexible” in FAIT becomes relevant. The FOMC will then trade off between two competing goals – 2% inflation and inclusive maximum employment.
Keywords. Quantity theory, Monetary policy.
JEL. E50, E53, E63.References
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