Abstract
Abstract. The paper considers public goods in the realm of international governance, provides a framework explaining their provision, and applies it in the analysis of the trade policymaking in the GATT/WTO. International governance regime is seen as a public good; it is conceptualized as an equilibrium state, one where the extent of ideational and material conflicts, incongruities in policy mechanisms and the lack of institutions are substantially minimised. Such state is brought by policy entrepreneurship on the part of multiple actors. Three generic entrepreneurial functions (policy leadership, innovation and facilitation/coordination) are identified. Successful equilibration is characterized by the complementarity of entrepreneurial functions, as well as by the persistence and ingenuity of entrepreneurs in selecting and using specific means and instruments of entrepreneurship. Policy entrepreneurship is considered crucial in several areas, including problem framing, advocacy and coalition building, policy experimentation, and creation of the analytical instruments. It is also salient in moderation of conflicting positions, exercise of influence and management of the policy process.
Keywords. Entrepreneurship, Public goods, Trade, International governance.
JEL. F13, F50, H41, L26References
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