Abstract
Abstract. The analysis discusses the labor market equilibrium under union oligopoly, where unions represent homogeneous workers and use employment strategies. The following points are addressed: 1. The labor market outcomes in the presence of; a. uncooperative behavior among unions; b. uncooperative environment with a leading union; c. collusive (coordinated unions) behavior among unions; d. globally efficient bargaining, are confronted. A specific example with a Stone-Geary utility function and linear demand is forwarded. 2. Supply dynamics may push up employment and, therefore, the number of unions. In equilibrium, some bounds exist to the number of unions the market can support, which are investigated in the example. Five supply dynamics are considered: a. reservation wage restriction; b. a standard labor supply constraint; c. number of unions equal demand; d. individualistic unions; e. existence of a minimum (employed) membership requirement. The equilibrium number of unions for the Cournot-Nash, Stackelberg and efficient bargaining structures is derived for the case where unions exhibit Stone-Geary preferences and labor demand is linear.
Keywords. Unions, Wage determination models, Union bargaining, Corporatism, Imperfect competition and union behavior. Union oligopoly.
JEL. J51, E24, D49, C79.References
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