Abstract
Abstract. In this study, in order to examine the turning point of institutional change, we analyzed civil wars from four aspects. Theoretical, simulation, empirical analysis, and case studies. By endogenizing political, economic, and military factors in the model, we have clarified the mechanisms by which civil wars occur. The robustness of the model is evident from simulation analysis and real-life cases. We showed that the weaker the initial challenger to the government, the greater the contribution of cooperation from the population and a third force to the challenger in the process of civil war, and thus the challenger cannot create a new autocratic government with a single group after winning the civil war. The challenger also has the advantage of prolonging the civil war. For the challenger, the probability of winning the civil war increases with the proximity of the challenger's political ideology to the population, and the probability of the challenger winning the civil war is also higher when the government loses the maintenance of the population's property and public goods and the stability of the price level. The decrease in the value of public and private goods of the population due to the hyperinflation described will lower the utility of both urban and rural residents.
Keywords. Comparative institutions; Institutional change; Civil-war; History of Chinese and Japanese political economies; Syria; Myanmar.
JEL. P16; P26; P51.
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