Abstract
Okul seçimi konusundaki temel meselelerden bir tanesi öğrenci yerleştirilmeleriyle ilgili bir mekanizma tasarlamaktır. Eğitim yazını, böyle mekanizmaların tasarlanmasıyla ilgili yol göstermesine rağmen belirli tasarılar sunmamaktadır. Halen var olan okul seçimi planlarındaki kusurlar, memnun olmayan velilerin itirazlarına sebebiyet vermektedir. Biz, okul seçimi problemini bir mekanizma tasarımı problemi gibi formüle edip Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis ve Seattle’dakilerin de aralarında olduğu mevcut okul seçimi planlarından bazılarını analiz ediyoruz. Bu planların ciddi yetersizlikler barındırdıklarını gösterip her biri önemli bazı okul seçimi meselelerine pratik çözümler getiren iki alternatif mekanizma öneriyoruz.References
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