Abstract
Abstract. The problem that arises is how the State official in a monopoly situation maximizes the value of bribes collected, by selling public services to users? To answer this question, we show that the State agent in a monopoly situation can discriminate users according to their characteristics in order to collect more possible bribes. The Shleifer and Vishny’ simple monopoly model is therefore limited. The survey of patients of nine public hospitals in Douala revealed the existence of two forms of corruption at consultation: corruption without theft and corruption with theft. An evaluation of maximizing the earnings of medical doctors using odds ratios, showed that in the pursuit of these gains and whatever the form of corruption practiced, the State agent plays not only on amounts of bribes paid, but also on users’ characteristics. However, for amounts between 3,000 FCFA and 5,000 FCFA, our results revealed that the doctor will tend to practice the form of corruption without theft on men, the wealthiest, the learned and the old where he/she would draw the greatest possible gain.
Keywords. Corruption with and without theft, Discrimination at first degree, Health system, Odds ratios, Cameroon.
JEL. D40, I10, I14, I15.
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