Abstract
Abstract. This study analyzes and highlights the most practised forms of corruption in public hospitals of Douala metropolis in Cameroon, namely corruption with theft and that without theft. The results of our analyzes show a predominance of the form without theft, this regardless of the hospital, and this allowed us to classify hospitals based on the dominant form. It appears that the General and Deido Hospitals are health facilities where corruption without theft is the least and the most practiced respectively, while the Cité des Palmiers and New Bell hospitals are those where corruption with theft is the least and the most practiced. An estimate through odds ratios revealed for instance that the odds would be about 5.46 times higher that the form without theft is not practiced at the General hospital compared to other hospitals, and about 11.11 times that it is practiced at Deido hospital compared to all hospitals.
Keywords. Corruption forms, Health system, Odds ratio, Cameroon.
JEL. I10, I14, I15.
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