Abstract
Abstract. We formulate and prove a theorem which consists in how the natural endogenous antagonist interaction of agents who look for understanding a generalizable phenomenon, results in a tendency towards chaos. This takes us to the final absolution of implementing the majority rule as the only instrument that generates socially acceptable knowledge, escaping from the chaos tendency. Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the arise of multiple simultaneous antagonist postures on the explanation of a phenomenon, and through an application of the Pythagoras theorem, we prove that it takes less effort or sacrifice for an agent to learn strategically to get an explanation, than if she was the creator of the concerning knowledge, which implies different consequences of possible topological private and public tendencies.
Keywords. Antagonist endogenous knowledge, Social entropy, Chaos theorem, Social choice.
JEL. B50, O31, O35.References
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